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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

G-3 SP OPS SECTION

2 June 1945

SUBJECT: COMMENDATION.

THROUGH: C.O. 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion (Prov) O.S.S.

TO : All Members of 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion (Prov) O.S.S.

1. For almost a year now, as Chief of the Special Operations Section, G-3 Division, A.F.H.Q., I have observed with satisfaction and admiration - not infrequently mixed with wonderment - the outstanding and almost unbelievable achievements and accomplishments of the 2671st Spec Recon Bn (Prov) O.S.S.

2. Operating continuously under the most hazardous, nerve and body wracking conditions; by the very nature of the duties and missions assigned being always denied the just recognition which comes to the ordinary combat soldier in timely increments; faced with the ever present danger of ignominious extinction by a fanatically desperate enemy, you inaugurated, perfected and waged successfully for U.S. forces a new and powerful type of warfare which we now know - from out of the mouth of the enemy himself - was the "straw which broke the Camel's back" of Axis Forces in Italy, and helped bring the war here to a successful conclusion much earlier than had been anticipated.

3. Now that the veil of secrecy which of necessity shrouded your every move and action is to be lifted, soon the very big part you played can be revealed, and I know there will be no brighter pages in history than those which recount your grand and glorious accomplishments in the Mediterranean and European Theatres of Operations.

4. Though I did not physically share in the hardships, discomforts, hazards and dangers which beset you all at every turn, and cannot therefore justly claim any part in the real doing, I am proud to have been associated with you and to enjoy a small reflection of the glory that is yours.

5. I wish you all "God Speed" and the best of good fortune.

Geo. L. King

GEO. L. KING,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief, Sp Ops Sec., G-3.

GLK/mr/Sp O

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

FORWARD HEADQUARTERS

19 August 1944

GMI/OL-G/383.4-3

SUBJECT: O.S.S. Reports

TO : C.O.,
O.S.S.,
European Theatre of Operations,
United States Army.

The series of reports transmitted to G-2 - SEAMY by O.S.S. from CHARTRES in the early stages of operation OVERLORD were exceptionally able and useful. It is with great regret that we saw this source later vanish.

E.T. FOORD,
Colonel.

for K.W.D. STRONG,
Major General, G.S.
A.C. of S, G-2.

Ltr

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS

1 August 1945

Major General William J. Donovan,
Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I would like to take this opportunity to express to you my great appreciation for the excellent services rendered by the OSS Detachment attached to the Seventh Army during the past year.

As you know, during the planning phase for our landing in Southern France, we were kept informed of the enemy's strength and activities by the excellent agents your men had placed there. Subsequently during the advance from the beaches to the Vosges Mountains, the OSS teams performed unusual and daring penetration missions. In the final phases of the war, from the breach of the Siegfried Line to the final collapse in Bavaria, the detachment performed outstanding intelligence service by penetration of the German lines, afoot and by parachute, thereby supplying timely and important information to the Seventh Army.

I have always been impressed with the superior men that you provided us and, although I did not become involved in the details of their operation, Colonel Quinn, my G-2, was constantly singing their praises for their fine attitude and determination to produce.

You have every reason to feel proud of the accomplishments of the detachment that served the Seventh Army and I assure you that I will ever be appreciative of their fine work.

Sincerely yours,

A. M. PATCH,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Supreme Headquarters
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

M/LN

27 July 1944

Colonel John HASKELL,
Chief, SI Branch,
Hq. & Hq. Detachment,
Office of Strategic Services, ETOUSA,

Dear Colonel Haskell:

The results obtained in the reports from the Sussex operation have been very helpful. Not only was the information useful, but compared with the great volume of CX reports received the level of accuracy has been gratifyingly high. The manner in which the operation has been carried out reflects the obviously excellent training which the intelligence teams had been given.

I am aware that in addition to the Sussex teams there are other CSS SI teams attached to First US Army, but I have not yet received sufficient reports on their work to be able to judge their performance.

Sincerely yours,

T.J. BETTS
Brigadier General, GSC
A. C. of S., G-2

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OCI Form 1400

Date 28 August

To: Miss O'Donnell C

From: Kay S. Clarke

I thank you very much. I hope you find useful and our purposes very well!

(3112) Current Intelligence Staff, S & A

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

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TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1944.

Dear Donovan:

I noted with interest the activities outlined in your recent memoranda. Detachment 101 appears to have been of great assistance to General Merrill's troops in his campaign against the Japanese over difficult terrain. General Stilwell has also remarked on their value. In view of the success of the Simalur Island reconnaissance group in completing its mission, I have brought that report to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending me these reports, and I am confident that future activities of OSS will be of comparable help toward the successful completion of the war.

Faithfully yours,

[illegible] General William J. Donovan,
[illegible] Strategic Services,
[illegible], D. C.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 512 U.S. ARMY

2 November 1944

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan,

You will find inclosed what this office thinks of the OSS (SI) contribution to Operation 'DRAGOON'. I fully concur with Colonel Kitchens' memorandum.

The success of the use of the system worked up for DRAGOON has resulted in the application of the same system to allcountry desks now. The improvement in the type of information now received is marked, and all due to the fact that the customer (G-2 in this case) is receiving from the procurer (OSS-SI) exactly what he has ordered.

The city team in Bucharest has done some fine work and it is hoped that the other city teams will be able to do as well. All the teams have been briefed and this office has seen to it that a questionnaire dealing with essential information is also in their hands. The latter will be amended from time to time before and after they go in.

Very sincerely yours,

C. C. SLOANE, Jr.
Colonel, GSC
D/A.C. of S., G-2

1 Incl:
G2I/01/ICB dtd 31 October 1944,
from Col (C) W.S. Kitchens.

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GBT/OI/IIB

30 October 194[illegible]

Memorandum for D/A. C. of S., G-2.

Subject : O.S.S. Contribution to Intelligence Collated for Operation DRAGOON.

1. The intelligence provided for Operation 'DRAGOON' was probably the fullest and most detailed of any provided by G-2, AFHQ in a series of combined operations commencing with 'TORCH'. The GOC, 7 U.S. Army himself paid a personal tribute to its 'extraordinary accuracy'.

2. The material collated by G-2, AFHQ came from a variety of sources but the very considerable contribution of O.S.S. merits special emphasis, not only on account of its intrinsic worth but because the results obtained provide a signal example of what can be done by an agency of this kind when it consents to work in closest cooperation with the Operational Headquarters which it is serving.

3. A rough estimate of the proportion of accepted ground Intelligence supplied by the three Allied agencies shows that 50% was provided by O.S.S., 30% by the S.T. and 20% by I.S.L.D.

4. The French Desk at Algiers maintained daily contact with the O.I. section at AFHQ. All the members of it were indefatigable in their efforts to secure the information requested. Nothing was declared to be impossible.

A full and accurate picture of the static situation in Southern FRANCE was gradually built up and when the events of July and early August threatened to confuse the whole issue by setting the whole enemy lay-out in motion, a phenomenally accurate check on troop movements was maintained with the result that we were not only able to keep 7 Army in possession of an up-to-date picture but also to provide SHAEF with information in advance of any other source.

5. I have had not inconsiderable experience of intelligence planning and am very fully aware of the patience and meticulousness required of both planners and intelligence agencies. I consider that the results achieved by O.S.S. in respect of Southern FRANCE before DRAGOON no outstanding that they should be brought to the attention of interested authorities, together with the names of our principal collaborators:-

Mr. Hyde (Head of Algiers French Desk)

Mr. Ryan (Chief scrutinising and dissominating officer)

Mr. Mathews, Mr. Carre and SAC Sgt. Machal Glass (Order of Battle Section)

Mr. Haas (Defences Section)

Major [illegible] (O.S.S. representative with 7 Army)

Mr. [illegible] (Madrid Desk)

[illegible], Col.

W. D. [illegible]
Lt. Col., G.S.C.
G-2 Section, A.F.H.Q.

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

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ADDRESS REPLY AS COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 25

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July [illegible], 1941

[illegible] Colonel Buxton:

[illegible] we received [illegible] letter of [illegible]
take [illegible] our [illegible]
Browne [illegible]
Auxiliary [illegible] to the
your letter.

[illegible]

[illegible]

Colonel [illegible] Buxton,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

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10 June 1944

The Honorable L. Rowland Shaw
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

In accordance with informal conversations between representatives of this office and officials of the Department of State, it is desired to have Mr. Horace A. Browne transferred from the Foreign Economic Administration to your Department. Mr. Browne who is a Civil Service employee, is to be an Auxiliary Foreign Service Officer (Vice Consul), and as such his salary, living allowance and other applicable expenses should be paid from the working funds established with your Department by this agency.

It is understood that Mr. Browne's salary will be $5600 per annum, and that his living allowance will be computed as that applied to other officials of his status who are assigned to the post where he is scheduled to perform duties.

Your assistance in effecting this appointment and transfer, and providing the arrangements whereby the necessary payments may be made from the working fund will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

KEW:jc
cc: Francis M. Barker
Mr. Krider
Woodring
Secretariat
Gen. Donovan

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs O'S.
please return file to personnel

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Attachment

Director

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CLARENCE E. KILBURN
11th Dist., New York

Secretaries
GEORGE T. CAFFREY
MARION C. COONEY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

March 17, 1945

Brig. General William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Twenty-fifth and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:-

I am in receipt of the enclosed letter from Miss [illegible] Brown, in behalf of her sister, Miss Ruth J. Brown, in your office. [illegible]

I shall [illegible]
Furthermore [illegible]
answer.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence E. Kilburn

Clarence E. Kilburn, M. C.

CEK/c
Enclosure

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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SECRET

4 March 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Major Charles J. Brown

SUBJECT: Orders

1. You are hereby designated Senior Security Officer for the Forish Post, ASIA and China Theaters in order to establish adequate security facilities and safeguards for all OSS installations in these theaters in accordance with the provisions of General Order No. 7, Supplement 19, attached.

2. You are authorized and directed to proceed immediately to [illegible], India, report to the Chief, OSS, SEAC, and act in conformance with orders issued by him as set forth in paragraph 1 hereof.

3. You are authorized and directed to proceed from there to Detachment 101, where you will report to the Commanding Officer of Detachment 101, acting under his command, accomplish the objectives set forth in paragraph 1 hereof.

4. You are authorized and directed to proceed from there to Chungking, China, report to the Chief, OSS, China, and acting under his command accomplish the objectives set forth in paragraph 1 hereof.

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SECRET

5. Should circumstances necessitate, you are authorized to vary the foregoing itinerary in such manner as you believe will best accomplish the purposes of this order.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

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January 25th, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO MISS VIRGINIA HAYDEN

SUBJECT: ORDERS

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to New Delhi, India, where you will report to the Chief, Office of Strategic Services, Southeast Asia Command, to act under the instructions of the Chief, Office of Strategic Services.

APPROVED:

Norton Bodfish
Deputy Chief, MO

Lt. (jg) George Demas
Acting FE Theatre Officer

APPROVED:

J. H. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

DRAFT

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Form 4003

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

To	Name	
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	C. A. Bane	
	J. B. Donovan	
	D. C. Lee	
	[illegible] S. Platt	
	[illegible] Pelloux	
	E. L. Putzell, Jr.	
	A. W. Sullowey	
	R. Thrun	
	Elles	

(Cont'd)

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22 December 1943

Honorable Francis Maloney,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator Maloney:

An extensive effort has been made to see that perhaps Mr. Lee B. Brooks, about whom you wrote a few weeks ago, could be placed in the office of Strategic Services.

Unfortunately, there is no place where we could use Mr. Brooks' talents. His experience has been almost exclusively of the legal nature and he has not had the type of foreign background that we are so anxious to obtain.

We appreciate your calling his name to our attention and if there is an opportunity to place Mr. Brooks in the future we shall certainly do so.

For the Director:

E. F. CONNELY,
Colonel, FA,
Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch

cc: Mr. Thrun

This closed the file at least for the present on Mr. Brooks. He has not any qualifications that can properly be used at this time.

E.F.C.

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To	Room No.	1945 AUG 21 11 43 Date. Initials.		Comments
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20440)

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HEADQUARTERS
2677th REGIMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (PROV.)
APO 512

13 August 1945

SUBJECT: Claims referred by Frederick Brown

TO: Commanding Officer, Office of Strategic Services, U. S. Forces, European Theater, Mission to France, A.P.O. 887, U. S. Army. (Attention: Lt. Carl S. Forsythe, Theater Counsel)

1. There is inclosed the file in respect to the above matter together with a letter of explanation dated 1 July 1945 from Charles T. Brown. Since the claimants are all residents of France, it would seem that you are in a better position to handle the matter.

2. It also appears that Mr. Brown contends he is in fact an agent who has been held in various concentration camps. This would seem to be war claims activity and should be referred to the proper branch. This office will appreciate your comment and advice.

For the Commanding Officer:

[illegible]
Capt. In., [illegible]
Theater Counsel

cc: Lt. Carl S. Forsythe

- 1 -

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July 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Colonel Edward J. P. Glavin
Attention: Captain David Crockett

FROM : The Acting Director

Attached you will find two letters from Frederick Brown, with whose background you are entirely familiar. His letters make two requests. First, he asks us to see what we can do to locate four agents who formerly worked for him in France and who were subsequently arrested by the Gestapo. The agents' names are:

LATTARD PAUL No Matricule 40779 FLOSSENBURG OBERPFALZ. Postent 2, 13 A DEUTSCHLAND
LISART JOSEPH M. R. 478 Block 1, Aufenthaltslager, Bergen-Belfsen. K.R.3. CELLE (Allemagne)
RENE CHARTON, arrete en Septembre 1943, et qui etait il y a un an, au camp de WEIMAR
ALBIN DAVIN, dit "Philippe", 53 ans, arrete en Septembre 1943 et qui etait, il y a un an, au camp de WIEMAR.

Will you see what you can do about this request.

Mr. Brown also encloses a series of bills for merchandise taken by the German Army. He claims that promises were given by Colonel Eddy to reimburse these people for such damages. Will you please investigate this matter and take whatever action you see fit.

Attached you will also find a copy of my letter to Mr. Brown, in which I tell him to get in touch with you directly.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

Enclosures

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7 July 1943

Mr. Frederick Brown
Foreign Economic Administration
APO 399

Dear Mr. Brown:

In the absence of General Donovan I am replying to your letters of 16 May and 5 June.

I have referred your letters to Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin, Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company, 2677th Regiment, OSS (Prov), APO 512, for action. You can rest assured that he will make a careful investigation of these claims and that we will do whatever we can to aid in locating the four persons mentioned in your letter of 16 May who assisted us in France in 1943.

Thank you for writing us on these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Chester

DATE: 7 July 1955

FROM : Osgood Nichols

SUBJECT: Frederic Brown

Frederic Brown did excellent work for Colonel Buxy in North Africa and Southern France in 1942 and 1943. In 1944 he was sent to Italy because he had become a troublesome security problem. He finally sent him back to Algiers where he was separated from the Army and retired to private life but he felt it was too much of a comedown to pick.

The bills he stood around $2,000 and are a little fantastic. Captain Crockett in Algiers is already familiar with Brown's background and is in the best position to handle his requests.

Osgood Nichols
Secretariat

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 January 1945

TO: Lt. (jg) Edwin J. Putzell

THROUGH: Mr. Edward L. Bigelow

FROM: Lt. William E. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown

The following is an extract from Special Order No. 3 dated 7 January 1945, Headquarters 2677th Reg., A.P.O. 512, U. S. Army.

Paragraph 2 - Captain Frederic Brown, 02 056 111, AUS, (SO) Headquarters Company, assigned to OSS, Washington, D. C., is relieved from assignment OSS, Washington, D. C., and from attachment this organization, and reverts to an inactive status effective 5 January 1945. Authority: letter order MTOUSA AG 201-P dated 7 December 1944.

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

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OSS
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JANUARY 4, 1945

FROM

CG, USAF, MEDITERRANEAN THEATER

ROUTINE
PRIORITY
DEFERRED

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION) SPACI FUNDS

(FOR INFORMATION) IN-3902

DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF [illegible], WAR, BOARD OF [illegible]

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

2601. Roid signed Lawrence, cite Algiers 16 F to Lt. Col. Williams, Finance Officer, OSS

Captain Frederic Brown, O-2066111, has requested that you inform this post of any amount that he still owes the US Government or that is due him as accrued salary prior to December 1st, 1944, this station. This officer has reported here for relief from active duty.

ACTION: OSS
CT IN-3902 (4 Jan ..) TOO 0409402

TOR: 1/5/45 9:18 a.m.

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

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OSS
Form 88 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 1, 1944 **REC'D** 12/5/44 11:29 AM

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO CG, AFHQ, CASERTA, ITALY

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT
~~OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES~~

AT 24527

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

WAR DEPARTMENT

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, [illegible], SECRETARY, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible]. DISPATCH.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER CONFIDENTIAL

WAR 71483. With reference to your CM-IN-5366 TAGAP, signed Mitchell, Acting TAG.

Please issue for Captain Frederic Brown, O-2056111, AUS, requisite orders DP relieving him from active duty status, giving him authorized travel time for his return home from Algiers. He is to be returned to inactive duty status as soon as authorized travel time expires. His orders should give the specific date he will revert to inactive duty. He should receive [illegible] and leave before depart term.* Physical examination will be given to Captain Brown. Should the examination reveal he has suffered disability rendering him eligible for retirement pay benefits, relief will be deferred and he will be placed in general hospital. This office will be advised of such action. Please wire effective date of relief. In addition, supply a copy of the relief orders to Commanding General, OSS, and 2 copies to TAG.

CONFIDENTIAL

* As received.

ORIGINATOR: ASF-TAG INFORMATION: OSS
CM-OUT-71483, 03:54 Z, Dec. 2, 1944.

TOR:(OSS Msg Center): 12/5/44 11:29 AM INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

FILE COPY

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1 December 1944

Captain Frederic Brown
c/o Commanding Officer
[illegible] Company
[illegible] (Prov)
c/o Postmaster

Dear Captain Brown:

I know you must by [illegible]
by the mode of [illegible]
[illegible] case pointed [illegible]
[illegible] mind the [illegible] is. I [illegible]
[illegible] you [illegible]
[illegible] you [illegible] combatant, and [illegible]
[illegible] our [illegible] [illegible]
the statute (which only Congress can [illegible]
[illegible] fact that under existing [illegible]
you cannot be made a citizen at this [illegible]
does not mean that we [illegible] grateful for what you have done. I express more than my personal feeling when I say that the American people owe you a debt of gratitude.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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SECRET

1 December 1944

Mr. Edward J. Shaughnessy
[illegible] L Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaughnessy:

I have been told of your efforts to help in the case of Capt. Ernest L. Brown. I know that there was no alternative to our decision that he is not eligible for citizenship under the statute.

Capt. Brown has returned to Algiers. He will, at least for the time being, remain there. I therefore do not think there is anything further that can be done now, even though I feel the American people owe him a debt of gratitude.

Your sympathetic understanding of these unusual but deserving cases is highly appreciated.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

17 November 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Lieutenant (jg) Robert Tarun

FROM: Office of General Counsel

SUBJECT: Naturalization of Captain Frederic Brown

1. I have discussed the question of Captain Brown's naturalization with Mr. John Hamilton of the Immigration and Naturalization Service on 30 October 1944, and with Mr. Edward J. Shaughnessy, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, on 1 November 1944. On both occasions Captain Brown was, at his request, present.

2. Both Mr. Shaughnessy and Mr. Hamilton take the position that, much as they sympathize with Captain Brown's position, nothing can be done for him under the existing statute providing for the naturalization of aliens serving in the U. S. armed forces (8 U.S.C. 1001). They point out that the statute requires that the alien be lawfully admitted to the United States and be a resident at the time of his induction into the armed forces. This requirement is not met in Brown's case, as he was appointed a commissioned officer in AUS in Algiers. Mr. Shaughnessy pointed out that the statute in question almost failed of passage as part of the Second War Powers Act 1942 until the provisions requiring residence in this country and record of lawful entry were inserted. It was also indicated to me, in connection with another and later case, that Immigration would not favorably regard and would not recommend to the naturalization court, a petition based upon discharge and reenlistment in this country, which it would consider an evasion of the statute.

3. Brown made no effort to conceal his disappointment and, when we left Shaughnessy's office on 1 November, he spoke to me rather bitterly about the promises which he claimed were made to him by OSS and others (including Ambassador Murphy and Generals Eisenhower and Clark) which he claimed were not fulfilled. Nothing

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which Mr. Shaughnessy or I could say to him appeared to convince him that it did not lie within the power of OSS and the United States Government to grant him U. S. citizenship if they were honestly disposed to do so. Brown said, however, that he regarded the incident as closed and that sometime after his return to Algiers he would apply for French citizenship.

4. Upon my return to the office, Mr. Shaughnessy telephoned me to say that he would give the matter further consideration and that he believed the case was so meritorious that the Immigration Service would advocate the passage of a private naturalization bill before Congress. He said that this was an extremely rare thing, and that only 16 prior bills granting citizenship had been passed since 1906. However, he said that Capt. Brown's case bothered him, and that he felt confident that if OSS would espouse such a measure, the Immigration and Naturalization Service would support its passage and arrange for the facts to be presented to the appropriate Congressional committees in executive session. I replied that the matter was one which would have to be presented to General Donovan for his attention, and that we would be in touch with him further concerning his kind and helpful suggestion.

5. For what it may be worth in any further consideration of this matter, it is my judgment, based upon conversations with Captain Brown, that he is led to seek U. S. citizenship more by a desire for the protection which citizenship would give him than by any intention of ever making this country his home.

John R. Schoemer, jr.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 October 1944

TO: Lt (jg) Robert Thrun

FROM: Lt. William J. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, A.N 0-2056111

1. As requested by telephone today, I have discussed the matter of Captain Frederic Brown with Mr. Van Beuren - Security Office. Introducing the discussion I read extracts from War Department circular No. 382 (attached).

2. Mr. Van Beuren's comments can be summed up in the following: That the Security Office has received information on the work accomplished by Captain Brown; that his office agrees that he acted with a great deal of loyalty toward the United States in furthering our war effort, and at extreme risks, and because of this qualifies for citizenship. Mr. Van Beuren stated that while Brown did constitute a personnel problem, his entire period of activity with this organization portrayed loyalty to the Allied war effort.

3. I am attaching hereto a draft letter to the Commanding Officer, Caserta, to whom Brown will report. If it is the wish of the Director that favorable action be taken overseas, Captain Brown should be furnished with copies of these communications for his files.

WILLIAM J. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

Encs. 2

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[Cir. 382]

CIRCULAR
No. 382

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington 25, D. C., 21 September 1944

NATURALIZATION OF NONCITIZENS SERVING IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

1. It is the policy of the War Department to expedite to the full practicable means the naturalization of noncitizen members of the Army who desire to become citizens of the United States provided they are of good character and well attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and favorably disposed toward the good order, welfare and happiness of the United States. The Congress has provided for the expeditious naturalization of such persons under the provisions of section 701 or 702, Title III, Nationality Act of 1940, as added by title X, Second War Powers Act, 1942 (8 U.S.C. 1a, Supp. III).

2. *a* In order to be eligible for naturalization under the provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended, a person must be a citizen of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands of the United States, or an outlying possession of the United States, and owe allegiance to the United States. Land leased by the United States for military purposes is not included in the term "outlying possessions."

b The Immigration and Naturalization Service holds that a person who performs military or naval service in the military or naval forces of the United States is not a citizen of the United States, or owing allegiance to the United States, or a national of the United States, or owing allegiance to the United States, within the meaning of section 701 or 702 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended. The determination of command authorities as to the time and circumstances under which persons may be released from active military service, and particularly as to the time of their departure from overseas areas, will be controlling in establishing proof of lawful entry at the time of the subject's induction. All becomes a matter of information upon which to base a decision.

3. Within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States, naturalization examiners of the Immigration and Naturalization Service are stationed at certain designated stations. A list of these offices is contained in paragraph 5*b*.

4. The general procedure to accomplish naturalization of noncitizens serving in continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands of the United States is as follows:

a Commanding officers of posts, camps, and stations will designate an appropriate and adequate space in which to afford persons desiring to make application, and to whom it is impracticable to accord such facilities upon the application. Because of the difficulty of accomplishing naturalization of overseas soldiers and the desirability of completing such naturalization without unnecessary delay for the place at which the preliminary application (Form N-400) is filed, commanding officers are enjoined to see that every reasonable endeavor is made to have completed action taken on each application prior to transfer of the applicant to another post, camp or station. The success of this program is dependent upon the energetic and positive action of commanding officers in conjunction with the appropriate officials of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the judges of the courts having jurisdiction.

b Commanding officers designated in paragraph 3 will secure from the nearest office of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service a supply of

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[Cir 389]

blank Forms N-[illegible] [illegible] "Preliminary Form for Petition for [illegible] the Nationality Act of 1940. These forms will be issued to legally admitted worthy noncitizens within the commutes [illegible] commissioned, warrant, or noncommissioned officers who know the applicant and who are able to identify the applicant before the representatives of the [illegible] [illegible] fee for examination prior to filing of formal petition.

2. All aliens found acceptable for military service [illegible] armed forces induction stations of the eight [illegible] that they will be given the opportunity [illegible] center if inducted into the Army or at the induction station for those who the Navy, and that it will be necessary for them to [illegible] Each such alien will be given a copy of the form to be placed [illegible] in exhibit A, 'Notice to Aliens Found Acceptable for Military Service.' Noncitizens passing through reception centers [illegible] centers. They will not except when directed personally [illegible] to be sent direct to post from reception center. [illegible] at the first post employment office where [illegible] right to apply for citizenship and there will be [illegible] 'Administrative' page of the call slip states [illegible] concerned desires to apply. There must be no [illegible] to the noncitizen that failure to apply [illegible] any way affect determinations concerning his [illegible] theater. He will be informed that if he does [illegible] process an application filed at a later date.

EXHIBIT A

NOTICE TO ALIENS FOUND ACCEPTABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

The Congress has provided a special procedure for [illegible] citizenship to worthy [illegible] of the United States [illegible] ship fill in the [illegible] of the United States. [illegible]

1. My full, true [illegible]

[illegible]

2. My place of residence [illegible] military or naval forces of the United States [illegible]

[illegible]

3. I was born on [illegible]

4. My personal description [illegible]
complexion [illegible]
height [illegible] feet, [illegible] inches; weight [illegible] pounds; visible distinctive marks [illegible]

5. I am [illegible] present nationality.
6. I have [illegible] children.
7. I emigrated to the United States, its Territories, or its possessions from [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

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tion and Naturalization Service),
ization under Section 701 or 702 of
rs will be distributed to eligible and
Witnesses listed on the form will be
ed officers (preferably counsel stood
will be available to appear with the
mmigration and Naturalization Serv
petition.

ry service will be informed at armed
pply for United States citizenship.
pply at the replacement training
al training center if inducted into
n to furnish certain information
to be reproduced locally) shown
one for Military Service." All non
will be sent to replacement training
l specifically by the War Department.
s. All noncitizens upon their arrival
eption center will be advised of their
be entered in the Remarks Column
record whether or not the individual
no coercion. It should be made clear
jection of his application will not in
assignment to or in an overseas
United States citizenship appli
practicable, if not impossible to

A

ABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE

procedure for granting United States
ibly in the military or naval forces
If you desire to apply for citizen
wing questions and be sure to bring
ments.

(Full and correct name of petitioner
(Last name—first name—middle name or initial—in capital letters)
for induction into the
(Number and street)
(State)
(City or town)
(Country)
color of hair
pounds, visible distinctive
attorney
(Address)

forces, or its possessions, from
(Country)

AGO 4-3B

8. My lawful admission to the United States for permanent residence or its possessions was at
(Place)
under the name of
(Name)
on the
(Month) (Day) (Year)

Declared at
(City or town) (State)

9. Photographs: Two recent photographs of good passport quality are required. Photographs taken with a Kodak or similar camera are not acceptable. The photographs must be of the petitioner only, must not be pasted or mounted in any way, and must be on thin paper. Each photograph should clearly show a front view of the petitioner's face without hat. Snapshots or group photographs cannot be used.

10. Notice of the date, time, and place at which the petitioner will be required to appear for examination before the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be sent to the petitioner at the address given in item 3 above. Petitioners should not take such additional steps as may be necessary to the purpose of ascertaining whether the petitioner is being considered by the United States Government for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States. Any petitioner who has been notified to report for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States should report for induction as directed and not apply for examination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Petitioners who are rejected for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States will be notified by the Immigration and Naturalization Service as to their eligibility for citizenship. Petitioners who are found acceptable for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States will be notified through the Selective Service System of the time and place of their induction.

Organization
Station
Date

For official use only

(Month) (Day) (Year)
ASN
(If applicant was inducted into Army prior to
entry into Military Service)
(Grade)
(Arm or service)
(Organization)
(Station)
Has applicant been rejected for military service?

Approval of the petition is recommended.
Remarks

a. Where large numbers of aliens are to be naturalized, the Immigration and Naturalization Service representatives will assemble them at a convenient place for the purposes stated in the above paragraphs and for the administration of the oath.

AGO 4-3B

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sonably be furnished by military authorities will be made available for the representatives

f Where only small numbers of applicants are involved, arrangements will be made for them to be examined with the greatest convenience to such time and at such place as convenient to the applicants, consistent with the best interests of the military and civilian authorities concerned.

7. *a* Hearings on petitions before the Judge shall be held at such time and place as he may designate, and shall be open to the public. Hearings will be arranged in accordance with the procedure established by the Court.

b Whenever possible, the examination of witnesses, the presentation and filing of formal petitions and the hearing thereon will be scheduled for the same place and time to minimize travel for the applicants and the official duties of the personnel involved. When hearings are held at which applications for naturalization will be granted, such hearings will be open to the public.

8. *a* The facts relative to the service of persons described in section 701 or 702, Nationality Act of 1940, will be recorded on Form N-426 in the service record under "Remarks." After the certificate of naturalization issued will be filed in the service record. The service record shall not in his possession and the when it will be delivered to him by the commanding officer. The enlisted man to acknowledge receipt thereof by signing the Administrative in his service record. Upon receipt of this Form steps will be taken to cancel the certificate and to attach it to the service records.

b In any case where upon the naturalization of the applicant the record shows, or the individual concerned states, that he has been in the service and the certificate of naturalization or a copy thereof is deemed to have been lost or destroyed, the certificate will be requested by the commanding officer to take all steps necessary to obtain the tion Service for the necessary action. The commanding officer of that service to attach permanently to the service records and should contain as complete information as possible concerning the naturalization of the applicant, including the number of the certificate.

c In the event of dishonorable discharge of the person concerned will be notified by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, Philadelphia 2, Pennsylvania, accompanied by a letter report setting forth the circumstances named in the naturalization certificate has been lost or destroyed, the the Army and the date of such discharge. A properly executed Form the Immigration and Naturalization Service, upon receipt of the request for titionee, with respect to the institution of cancellation proceedings for the position of the naturalization certificate under the provisions of section 338 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended. When the dishonorable discharge of the naturalization certificate has been lost or destroyed, has commanding officers shall report the Immigration and Naturalization Service by a letter setting forth the facts including the date of such discharge.

7. The following information will be furnished the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in which the Form N-426 is pending concerning an applicant for citizenship who is transferred, before citizenship is granted or denied, from the post, camp, or station at which the preliminary application Form N-402 was executed:

A G 1128

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...ties will be made available to these

...nts are involved, arrangements will
...w assess and to file petitions at such
..., camp, or station as may be agreed
...ce concerned
...of courts having jurisdiction will
...es described in paragraph 1
...plicants and witnesses, the prepara
...meetings the room will be conducted at
...ime from training and other military
...rings on petitions result favorable,
...tes of naturalization will be signed

...rtificate and appropriate reference to
... will be entered in the enlisted man's
...ation". The original of the "Record
...safekeeping with the enlisted man's
...notably separated from the service
...anding officer who will require the
... by signature under "Remarks"
...receipt of this circular mandate
...zation certificates filed in 201 files

...ge cation from the service the service
...d states that he was naturalized while
...ization cannot be located and its
...and tribunal concerned will be requested
...tion to the Immigration and Naturaliza
...application may be filed with the office
...present residence address of the appli
...as can be furnished concerning the
...h the number of the naturalization cer

...the naturalization certificate of the
...Target's commanding officer to the
...Department of Justice, Philadelphia,
...ion setting forth the fact that the person
...s been dishonorably discharged from
...e. Appropriate action will be taken by
...ces, upon receipt of the letter and
...f cancelation proceedings and final
...under the provisions of section 701 of the
...Where the dishonorable discharge's natu
...ayed, his commanding officer will not
...e by a letter setting forth the facts

...ished the office of the Immigration
...rm N-403 is pending concerning each
...ved, before citizenship is granted or
...which the preliminary application Form

AGO 433B

a Name.
b Army serial number.
c Date of arrival at post, camp, or station.
d Date of execution of Form N-403.
e Office of Immigration and Naturalization Service to which executed Form N-403 was sent.
f Post, camp, or station to which transferred.
g Date of transfer.

8. Overseas theater, force, or base commanders, except Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States having eligible and worthy noncitizens in their commands who desire citizenship will communicate with the nearest designated official on the list contained in paragraph 9 in order to make arrangements for the conveniences location of applications from such noncitizens. Overseas stations situated so remote from the nearest location listed in paragraph 9 as to make it impracticable for such official to act will report the facts to the Executive Director, Office of the Adjutant General (Army), in order that stations the examination, taking of fees, and petition hearing, and granting of naturalization will be conducted at one time by the Immigration and Naturalization Service official.

9. Consular officers of the Department of State of the following countries have been designated by the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, as persons authorized to act as designated representatives of the Attorney General under the provisions of section 702 of the Nationality Act of 1940, as amended:

AFRICA
- Algeria:
  - Algiers
  - Oran
- Belgian Congo:
  - Leopoldville
- Egypt:
  - Alexandria
  - Cairo
- French West Africa:
  - Dakar
- Liberia:
  - Monrovia
- Morocco:
  - Casablanca
  - Tangier
- Tunisia:
  - Tunis
- Union of South Africa:
  - Capetown, Cape Province
  - Durban, Natal
  - Port Elizabeth, Cape Province
- West Africa:
  - Accra, Gold Coast
  - Lagos, Nigeria

ASIA:
- India:
  - New Delhi (for China, Burma, India)
- Iran:
  - Tehran

AUSTRALIA:
- New South Wales:
  - Sydney
- Queensland:
  - Brisbane
- South Australia:
  - Adelaide
- Western Australia:
  - Perth
- Victoria:
  - Melbourne

BERMUDA
- Hamilton

BRITISH ISLES
- England:
  - Birmingham
  - Bradford
  - Bristol
  - Liverpool
  - London
  - Manchester
  - Newcastle-on-Tyne
  - Plymouth
- Ireland (Eire):
  - Dublin
- Northern Ireland:
  - Belfast
- Scotland:
  - Edinburgh
  - Glasgow
- Wales:
  - Cardiff

EUROPE.
- Belgium:
  - Antwerp
  - Brussels
- France:
  - Paris
- Italy:
  - Naples
  - Palermo

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FIJI ISLANDS:
Suva
GREENLAND
Godthaab
ICELAND
Reykjavik
NEW CALEDONIA:
Noumea
NEW ZEALAND:
Auckland
Wellington
NORTH AMERICA
Canada (Consulate Seattle, Wash., office of the Immigration Service)
Newfoundland
St Johns
PANAMA CANAL ZONE:
Ancon (U.S.D.C. Attorney's office at end of consular offices)
SOUTH AMERICA:
Brazil
Pernambuco (Recife)

10. Offices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

ALABAMA
Mobile 2, 121 U.S. Courthouse & Customhouse (P.O. Box 394)
ALASKA
Fairbanks, Customs Office
ARIZONA
Phoenix 13, New Post Office Bldg., N. Central Avenue & Fillmore St.
Tucson, Post Office Bldg., Scott & Broadway
CALIFORNIA:
Fresno 1, 310 Post Office Bldg.
Los Angeles 13, Rowan Bldg., 458 South Spring St.
Sacramento 9, 471 Federal Bldg.
San Diego, 3rd Floor U.S. Customhouse & Courthouse Bldg.
San Francisco 12, 801 Silver St.
Selma, Bank of America Bldg.
Stockton 3, 211 212 City Hall
CONNECTICUT
Hartford 1, 207 Post Office Bldg.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Washington 1, 268 Hopkins Bldg., 320 1st St. N.W.
FLORIDA:
Jacksonville 1, U.S. Courthouse & Post Office Bldg. (P.O. Box 46 Sta.)
Miami 32, 701 Professional Bldg. (P.O. Box 2311)
Tampa 1, Federal Bldg. (P.O. Box 3767)
GEORGIA
Atlanta 3, 22 Marietta Street Bldg.
Savannah 208 Customhouse, No. 1, East Bay St. (P.O. Box 218)
HAWAII:
Honolulu 9 (P.O. Box 861).
ILLINOIS:
Chicago 7, Post Office Bldg., Van Buren & Clark Sts.
INDIANA:
Hammond, 323 Post Office Bldg.
LOUISIANA
New Orleans 12, 2131 St. Charles Ave.
MAINE:
Bangor 1, U.S. Post Office Bldg., Main St. at U.S. Route 2
Portland 6, 316 Courthouse Bldg.
MARYLAND:
Baltimore 2, 215 Hearst Tower Bldg.
MASSACHUSETTS:
Boston 9, 34 Tremont St.
Springfield 3, 378 Post Office Bldg.
MICHIGAN:
Detroit 7, 3770 E. Jefferson Avenue
Flint 2, Post Office Bldg., Church & Saginaw Sts.
Port Huron 22, 4 Rapids St.
Sault Ste. Marie, Post Office Bldg., Portage Avenue
MINNESOTA:
Duluth, 329 Post Office Bldg., 521 West First St.
Minneapolis 401 Federal Office Bldg., Washington Ave. & Third Ave. South
St. Paul 1, New Post Office Bldg., Kellogg Blvd.

MONTANA
Helena, Federal Bldg. [illegible]
NEVADA
Reno, 221 Bryan Bldg.
NEW JERSEY:
Newark 2, 1060 Broad St.
NEW MEXICO
Albuquerque, U.S. Courthouse [illegible]
NEW YORK
Albany 1, 518 Federal Bldg.
Buffalo 2, 230 Delaware Avenue
New York 23, 70 Columbus Avenue
Rochester 14, 20 Federal Bldg.
Syracuse 1, 301 Federal Bldg.
NORTH CAROLINA
Wilmington, 223 Post Office [illegible]
NORTH DAKOTA
Fargo, 311 Black [illegible]
OHIO
Cleveland 14, 435 Federal Bldg.
Cincinnati 1, Post Office & Courthouse, 5th & Main Sts.
Columbus, 358 New Post Office & Courthouse
Toledo 2, 305 New Federal Bldg.
Youngstown, 305 U.S. Post Office
OREGON
Portland 5, U.S. Courthouse, Broadway & [illegible]
PENNSYLVANIA
Erie 30, New U.S. Courthouse
Lewisburg, Post Office Bldg.
Philadelphia 7, 3rd & Chestnut Sts.
Pittsburgh 19, 700 New Post Office Bldg.
Wilkes-Barre, Post Office Bldg.
PUERTO RICO:
San Juan 9, Post Office & Courthouse Bldg.
RHODE ISLAND
Providence 3, 217 Post Office Bldg.
SOUTH CAROLINA
Charleston, U.S. Customhouse, East Bay
TEXAS
Brownsville, Gateway Bridge
Dallas 1, Burt Bldg. (P.O. Box 325)
El Paso, U.S. Courthouse
Fort Worth 2, U.S. Courthouse
Houston 1, Sealtest Office Bldg. (P.O. Box [illegible])
San Antonio 6, U.S. Post Office & Courthouse
UTAH
Salt Lake City, 407 Post Office Bldg.
VERMONT:
St. Albans, 45 Kingman St.
VIRGINIA
Norfolk 10, 467 New Monroe Bldg.
VIRGIN ISLANDS:
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas.
WASHINGTON
Tacoma, Post Office Bldg., 11th & A Sts.
Spokane 8, 363 Wasch Bldg. Cor. Howard St.
Seattle 4, 815 Airport Way.
WISCONSIN
Milwaukee, Federal Bldg.

11. Reproduction of naturalization certificates
attention of the War Department that naturalizat
graphed at various Army posts.

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MONTANA
Helena, Federal Bldg., Sixth & Park Sts
NEVADA
Reno, 321 Bytogton Bldg
NEW JERSEY
Newark 2, 1060 Broad St
NEW MEXICO
Albuquerque, U. S. Courthouse, Gold & Fifth Sts
NEW YORK
Albany 1, 413 Federal Bldg
Buffalo 2, 220 Delaware Avenue
New York 23, 70 Columbus Avenue
Rochester 14, 20 Federal Bldg
Syracuse 1, 301 Federal Bldg
NORTH CAROLINA
Wilmington, 208, 223 Post Office Bldg
NORTH DAKOTA
Fargo, 311 Black Bldg
OHIO
Cleveland 14, 435 Federal Bldg
Cincinnati 1, Post Office & Courthouse Bldg. (P. O. Box 377)
Columbus, 351 New Post Office Bldg. P. O. Box 2760
Toledo 2, 315 New Federal Bldg
Youngstown, 301 U. S. Post Office.
OREGON
Portland 5, U. S. Courthouse, Broadway & Main Sts
PENNSYLVANIA
Erie, 130 New U. S. Courthouse
Lewisburg, Post Office Bldg.
Philadelphia 7, Market Street National Bank Bldg
Pittsburgh 19, 700 New Post Office Bldg
Wilkes-Barre, Post Office Bldg
PUERTO RICO
San Juan, Post Office & Courthouse Bldg. (P. O. Box 791)
RHODE ISLAND
Providence 3, 218 Post Office Bldg
SOUTH CAROLINA
Charleston, U. S. Customhouse, East Bay & Market Sts. (P. O. Box 285)
TEXAS
Austin, 300 Guaranty Bldg.
Dallas, 1114 Commerce St. (P. O. Box 1)
El Paso, U. S. Courthouse
Fort Worth, 2 U. S. Courthouse
Houston, 311 Federal Bldg. (P. O. Box 1089)
San Antonio, U. S. Post Office & Courthouse (P. O. Box 2679)
UTAH
Salt Lake City, 307 Post Office Bldg. (P. O. Box 0281)
VERMONT
St. Albans, 45 Kingman St
VIRGIN ISLANDS
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas,
WASHINGTON
Tacoma, Post Office Bldg., 11th & A Sts
Seattle 4, 307 Wesley Bldg. (Cor. Howard St. & Mercer Ave
Spokane 1, 815 Airport Way
WISCONSIN
Milwaukee, Federal Bldg

H. Reproduction of naturalization certificates prohibited. [illegible] attention is called to War Department that naturalization [illegible] groups [illegible] Army posts.

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[Cir. 3, 1]

a. Section 1861(a), 2d of the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 166, as amended, makes it unlawful for any person

To prevent [illegible] photographed, sketched, [illegible] or any part thereof

b. A [illegible] reproduction [illegible] such [illegible] part of [illegible] grant or purchase [illegible] will [illegible]

12. Rescission of previous instructions. [illegible] Circular No. 1, War Department, 1913, pertaining to [illegible] rescinded.

[A. G. 014.1 (3-1-16) M.]

By order of the Secretary of War

G. C. MARSHALL,
[illegible]

OFFICIAL:
J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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SECRET

DRAFT

23 October 1944

TO: Commanding Officer, Caserta

FROM:

1. Reference to communication of Robert Murphy dated 6 September 1944, it is recommended that Captain Frederic Brown be given all possible assistance in his efforts to acquire American citizenship before his severance from United States service is effected.

2. You are entirely familiar with the character of work accomplished by him while in the service of our country. It is our firm belief that he qualifies for naturalization, having satisfied the provisions of par 1 of War Department circular No. 382 dated 21 September 1944.

SECRET

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COPY

Department of State
Washington

September 8, 1944

Dear Colonel Hoffmann:

I had pleasure today in receiving the visit of my old friend, Captain Frederick Brown, who, I believe, is working under your orders. As you may have been informed, Captain Brown worked under my supervision as an Agent in North Africa for a period of months prior to the Allied landings on November 8, 1942. Subsequent to that date he was also useful to my office, although he was then working directly for the Office of Strategic Services.

I know that during all this time Captain Brown completely neglected his personal affairs and devoted himself with great loyalty to the performance of duties which were of direct and great benefit to the Allied cause. He tells me there is now a question regarding his nationality, and I believe that you could be of assistance to him in acquiring American nationality. I take the liberty of recommending Captain Brown to you and will be very grateful indeed to you for whatever you may be able to do for him.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Robert Murphy

American Ambassador

Lieutenant Colonel Carl O. Hoffman,
Office of Strategic Services,
Twenty-fifth and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

A TRUE COPY

WM. E. DUGGAN, 1st Lt, USMCR

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I have been invited to present a statement of my services entitling me to four stars on my theatre ribbon. There follows a summary of my service:

1) Under orders from the Honorable R. D. Murphy, U.S. Minister, and later of Col. Eddy, Naval attache at Tangier thereafter commanding OSS Algiers, I organized the system of secret radio communications between Algiers and Gibraltar which served the Allied landing operations. I took an active part in the actual landing operations.

2) I organized the first Franco-Anglo-American secret submarine expedition to Corsica (submarine CASABIANCA, Dec. 11, 1942) and went with this expedition into Corsica for the purpose of organizing the first secret radio and intelligence network in that island for the account of OSS, Algiers, who received that intelligence on its receiving station thereafter. I received the Croix de Guerre from the French CIC for this action.

3) I organized a second expedition into Corsica for the account of OSS, shipping 1,000 sub-machine guns into Corsica. I continued into France where I landed on February 5, 1943 with 2 W/T sets for OSS which I installed, creating at the same time an intelligence network which was developed later.

4) I returned to France a second time on June 19, 1943 by parachute with other W/T sets, and developed this intelligence chain which, incidentally, supplied some of the information required for the first bombardment of Istres and Salon. During this mission I had the pleasure of killing five Gestapo men, two on July 9, three on October 4. I organized a pouch service for OSS via Spain which required my crossing the Pyrenees three times before I finally left France on October 17, 1943.

Respectfully,

Frederic Brown
Captain, US
2677th HQ Company

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(Translation form French original)

COPY OF ORIGINAL

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
GROUND AND AIR FORCES
IN FRENCH AFRICA

ALGIERS, 21 NOVEMBER, 1942

HEADQUARTERS
1st Office
N° 531/1

ORDER N° 6

Cited by order of the French Army in Africa

Mr. BROWN, Frederic
Attache of the Consulate of the United States of America, Algiers

"Has organized and carried out, in liaison with the French Forces, a dangerous mission of highest importance to the conduct of the war, thus demonstrating his allegiance acting for the French Nation."

This citation bears the award of the Croix de Guerre with palm.

General of the Army, GIRAUD - Commander in Chief of Ground and Air Forces in French Africa

Signed: GIRAUD

P.A. The Chief of Staff

Signed: DEVINCK

Distribution:

Messrs. Frederic BROWN, Consulate of the United States of America, Algiers

The General, Chief of the French Military Mission with the Allied Forces.

Copy to: The General, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces, (Liaison Section)

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY

ALGIERS, 24 DECEMBER 1942

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR

General MAST - Chief of the French Military Mission with the Allied Forces

By order: Colonel RIMB-BRUNEAU - Chief of Staff

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10/12

General Donovan

Lt. Dugkan, SO Deputy Chief, is handling Brown's case. He is to be sent back to Caserta from there he will be sent to Algiers and discharged from the Army.

He was recruited in Algiers (where his home is located). Arrangements have been made with the War Department to notify AG in Caserta that this is to be effected there.

E. J. Putzell Jr.

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RUSH

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

AIR DISPATCH

FROM: Hq 2677th Regt OSS (Prov)
GERALD R. MURPHY, Adj. DATE: 3 October 1944

TO: Mr. Edward H. Dodd IN 22309
MEDTO, OSS, Washington, D. C.

NUMBER: ADW/190 CLASSIFICATION: Confidential

DO NOT FILL IN FOR USE OF MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

MEDTO	DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, HQ.DET, X-2

Further information is requested concerning the discharge and return to Algiers of Captain Frederick Brown. Washington Cables 104, September 16, and 158(4), September 20, indicate he is to be discharged in the United States. Copy of letter to CPD, 25 September 1944, Subject: "Request for Transportation and Orders" received here today lists Captain Brown under Section b. Casuals (1) Army Personnel.

Please advise the present status of the case. If he is being returned as an officer, we want to be able to take any required action to expedite his release and will need a complete file of action taken in Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE OCTOBER 18, 1944 REC'D 10/18/44 6:13 PM OUT 20649

TO CASERTA PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIRMATION MEDTO

INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, X-2.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER CONFIDENTIAL

#6731. FROM DODD. RELAY TO EXDET, ALGIERS.

TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CAPT. FREDERICK BROWN TO MRS. BROWN IN ALGIERS: "DO NOT WAIT FOR ME IN ALGIERS. TAKE CHILDREN TO GOURAYA." REQUEST REPLY.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE COPY

TOD: 10/18/44 7:02 PM

INITIALS: EHD.

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RUSH

OFFI[illegible] OF STRATEGIC SER[illegible]CES

AIR DISPATCH

AT 20345

FROM Lt. William E. Duggan DATE 14 October 1944

TO: Hq 2677th Regt OSS (Prov) [illegible] APO [illegible], A.P.O.

NUMBER WC 130 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL

DO NOT FILL IN - FOR USE OF MESSAGE CENTER ONLY

SI	DIRECTOR, [illegible], MACDILL, [illegible], G-2, [illegible]

In answer to your communication 3 October 1944, the following information is requested to indicate the present status of Captain Frederic Brown's case.

1. He has requested discharge from OSS to occur in Algiers, where he was recruited and commissioned.

2. Application for his discharge has been made through the War Department, Washington. His papers have been forwarded to G-1 for their action. He will depart from the U.S. by water transportation as an officer. Upon arrival at your Headquarters, steps should be taken to initiate his discharge, and contact with Headquarters, Washington, should be made in order that this Headquarters may signal G-1 to contact the Theater Commander and so move your actions in discharge. Major Allen, Assistant, Hq. & Hq. Detachment, is to contact with Colonel Dukes, G-1, and will assist in making the necessary arrangements when received.

3. If Captain Brown's discharge is completed in Caserta, he should be returned to Algiers. [illegible] rated this case a security measure for four months after his discharge he will go to his home in Corsica, eighty miles west of Algiers.

4. Previous correspondence sent to Colonel Glavin includes Brown's request for discharge, and descriptive matter covering our actions to date. If you are presently holding these papers, a cable request for same will be noted upon immediately.

[illegible]

TD: 10/15/44 10:00 A.M.

TD [illegible]
INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

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RUSH

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

AIR DISPATCH

FROM: Hq 2677th Regt OSS (Prov)
GEN[illegible] A. DUFFEY, Adj. DATE 3 October 1944

TO: Mr. Edward H. Dodd IN 22309
MEDTO, G-2, Washington, D. C.

NUMBER 23W/90 CLASSIFICATION Confidential

DESTINATION (PLACE)	MESSAGE (CONTINUED)
MEDTO	DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, HQ. DET, X-2

Further information is requested concerning the discharge and return to Algiers of Captain Frederick Brown. Washington Cables 104, September 16, and 1584, September 20, indicate he is to be discharged in the United States. Copy of letter to OPD, 25 September 1944, Subject: "Request for Transportation and Orders" received here today lists Captain Brown under Section B. Casuals (1) Army Personnel.

Please advise the present status of the case. If he is being returned as an officer, we want to be able to take any required action to expedite his release and will need a complete file of action taken in Washington.

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[illegible]
INITIALS OF RELEASING OFFICER

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DATE _____ REC'D

PRIORITY

TO _____ ROUTINE

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 2/15/44

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

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[illegible] Giraud to JOS [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

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Form 60 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 22, 1944

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

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[illegible] Clarin to Donovan. [illegible]
last July, in connection [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]

TOR: 9/22/44 7:43 AM

FILE

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68 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

REC'D September 20, 1944 12:02?

DATE September 20, 1944

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TO CASERTA

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CIR 1-2510

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(FOR INFORMATION)

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SECRET

#1564. 1.0 for Flavin.

In view of liberation of Southern France, believe it not inappropriate [illegible] return-
accordingly [illegible] destabilized on this side and then
[illegible] by Joint Action.
[illegible] CASERTA and air priorities.

SECRET

[illegible] 9/20/44 [illegible] PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE SEPTEMBER 15, 1944 REC'D 9/16/44 5:52 PM. SU- 13072

TO CASERTA PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONFIRMATION SO

INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, MEDTO, X-2.

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#1044. MURPHY FROM HOFFMANN AND BIGELOW.

1. REQUEST FOR DISCHARGE OF CAPTAIN BROWN HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO AGO FOR ACTION.

2. IN VIEW OF 109'S REQUEST THAT BROWN REMAIN HERE UNTIL HIS RETURN AGO'S ACTION HAS BEEN RETARDED AWAITING FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

TOD: 9/16/44 10:43 PM.

INITIALS: ELB, COH: H, RH: EHD

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE SEPTEMBER 14 1943

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION: EYES ONLY

INFORMATION: DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, [illegible]

✓

#2541. MURPHEY TO [illegible]

ADVISE THAT ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY YOUR [illegible] DEPARTMENT ON DISCHARGE OF CAPTAIN [illegible].

NO AUTHORITY EXISTS FOR THEATER COMMANDER TO EFFECT [illegible] DISCHARGE. IT MUST BE ORDERED BY [illegible]. THIS IS IN SPITE OF YOUR LETTER OF 31 AUGUST.

[illegible] DELAYED BY CABLE.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 13, 1944

FROM

CASERTA, ITALY

TO

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DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

G-2, BIGELOW, JTUSO, [illegible],
G-2, SECRETARIAT.

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#1822. Flavin to Donovan.

Brown's transfer at any time to this theater would endanger our position, as previously stated in cables exchanged months ago. We have relayed your message to Gamble for Hyde.

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TOR: 9/14/44 4:04 PM

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 12, 1944 **REC'D** 9/13/44

TO

CASERTA, ITALY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE Sept. Dec 6, 1944 REC'D 12/6/44

TO

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE SEPTEMBER 8, 1944 REC'D 9/8/44 6:27 PM OUT 19788

TO USTRAVIC, LONDON PRECEDENCE

FROM OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CLASSIFICATION SECRET

CONFIRMATION SO

INFORMATION DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER, BIGELOW, ETO, X-2.

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#67934. 109 FROM CHESTON AND HOFFMANN.

1. HAVE CANCELLED TRANSPORTATION FOR TOMMY BROWN AS DIRECTED IN YOUR #51164.

2. PREVIOUS TO RECEIPT OF YOUR MESSAGE, BROWN IN CONTACT WITH BOB MURPHY, WHO IS HERE. MURPHY WROTE US COMMENTING ON BROWN'S GREAT LOYALTY, AND PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES IN CONNECTION WITH ALLIED CAUSE, AND HAS RECOMMENDED THAT WE TAKE STEPS TO ASSIST BROWN IN ACQUIRING AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP.

3. UPON RECEIVING NEWS OF CANCELLATION OF HIS TRANSPORTATION, BROWN IS SEEKING ASSISTANCE OF MURPHY IN BRINGING HIS PROTEST AGAINST OUR ACTION TO ATTENTION OF HIGHEST AUTHORITIES.

TOD: 9/8/44 8:29 M PM INITIALS: COH, CSC.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE September 8, 1942

FROM

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

7 September 1944.

Dear Colonel Buxton,

Thank you for your letter of 11 July with reference to Captain Frederic Brown. I am sorry that acknowledgement has been so long delayed, but I have just returned from a six weeks tour.

Sincerely,

Clayton Bissell
CLAYTON BISSELL
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2

Colonel G. Edward Buxton, Assistant Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/16 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100220002-8

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CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel H. L. Robinson

FROM: J. M. Scribner

SUBJECT: Captain Frederick Brown

Lieutenant Duggan has just shown me a letter he has received from subject officer, dated 27 July, 1944, copy of which is attached. I would not write you on this matter except that the letter seems to have been written subsequent to our conversation last week when you discussed with me the difficulties Major Allen was having with Captain Brown, including the question of the latter's having leave in Avalon.

It is entirely possible that Major Allen had not received word from you prior to the date of Captain Brown's letter, but I felt it would be desirable to give you a memorandum outlining my understanding of General Donovan's wishes with respect to the treatment to be accorded Captain Brown.

As you already know, it is the General's intention to return Brown to North Africa about 1 September, that is, he is to leave this country about that date, where he is to be demobilized. During this interval, it was not considered desirable that he have the free run of Washington, inasmuch as he is given to somewhat loose conversation.

OSS has received very valuable service from Captain Brown in the past and wishes to recognize this fact and treat him accordingly, but in the light of the aforementioned fact.

After long conversations it was decided it was best to send Captain Brown to Catalina where he would be out of harm's way and where his contacts would be with OSS people and not with outsiders, and treat him as the others, and to return him to Washington at such time as he was to be shipped overseas.

In discussing with General Donovan the possibility that Captain Brown might not be cooperative, the General expressed rather positively that unless the Captain were willing to cooperate with us, in view of our attempts to cooperate with him, he would not hesitate to "remove him to a remote part of the Island and put him under guard." This, however, was obviously intended to meet a situation which the Captain might cause himself as a result of his failure to cooperate and adopting an attitude which was difficult, troublesome and bad for the morale of the other [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

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on the Island. On the other hand, it was not our intention that he should have the free access to the main land and the run of Los Angeles or San Francisco.

This whole situation is one which calls for very diplomatic handling on the part of Major Allen. It seems to me that the Captain should be given the same freedom on the Island as is accorded any of the other officers and that if he raises the question of a week end pass to the main land, Major Allen should take the matter up with you who should take it up with Colonel Bigelow or Colonel Hoffmann for guidance.

If, despite the fact that Captain Brown is not satisfied with the treatment he is receiving, which is identical with the others on the Island, and causes a disturbance or makes it difficult for Major Allen, if you will advise one of the aforementioned officers, they will take the matter up with General Donovan and advise you whether the General wishes to implement his comment mentioned earlier in this letter.

The main thing to avoid is having Captain Brown cause trouble because of any fault on our part in respect to the manner in which he is treated.

J. H. Scribner
Deputy Director - SO

JHS/mcp

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Frederick Brown, Capt., AUS
P. O. Box D-1, Avalon,
California

27 July 1944

1st Lt. Duggan:

I arrived here at Catalina Island on the 25th of July after a normal trip. The Island is wonderful but I am sorry that your dealing with me is not wonderful. I expect a rectification of the order from Mr. Scribner which put me in a very wrong situation between my comrades here on the Island. This is certainly not the right of Mr. Scribner to diminish my officers right without a Courts Martial. You know very well I do my job for the United States to satisfaction and I want my last days that I spend in the United States not to be remembered by me as days of a prisoner but as an Officer with the same right as other officers. You must understand that I will do everything against your order which I consider as a law against American tradition. You know my fight against Germand, against Gestapo methods and for liberty so I do not like for anybody to use Gestapo methods here in the United States against me, especially from persons who are not doing as dangerous a work for their country as I do for United States.

I expect you to rectify your mistake and to order Major Allen that I am to be considered exactly with the same rights as the other Training Officers, otherwise I must stand Court Martial to obtain my rights which have been taken from me without consideration.

Truely yours,

FREDERICK BROWN
Capt., AUS

C O P Y

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OSS
Form 60 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

FROM

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Schools and Training Branch
2324 F Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

27 July 1944

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, ASN O-2056111

TO: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

1. I am enclosing herewith a copy of letter which I have just received from Major Allen on the subject of Captain Brown.

2. Major Allen protested vehemently when I informed him that we were sending Captain Brown to him, and I believe that he has written this letter not so much as a form of protest, but as a means of having on record his reactions in case future troubles should develop in this case.

3. I am sending Major Allen's letter to you so that you will also have a copy on record in case there are future developments.

H. L. ROBINSON
Colonel, F.A.
Chief, Schools & Training Branch

1 Incl.
Cy. ltr. Major Allen

To Col. Buxton
Think you should see this last letter from
Major Allen when you
please return to Robinson
Case

July 8 copy

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MARITIME UNIT
BOX I
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

19 July, 1944

From: Major Philip K. Allen, FA.
To: Colonel H. L. Robinson, Chief, Schools and Training Branch.

Subject: Captain Frederic Brown, AGN, O-2056111.

1. In answer to your memorandum, dated 13 July, 1944, concerning the disposition of the above-named officer, it is deemed necessary to make written protest against the directive which sends him to the West Coast, even though said directive is a general one.

2. Captain Brown, though undoubtedly a courageous and highly motivated individual, is a security problem. He was sent back from Africa because of his inability to keep his mouth shut, among other reasons. That he should be sent to that one of our areas which is the most secure, seems to be most undesirable.

3. Captain Brown is an arrogant self-willed egotist, and as such will undoubtedly react unfavorably to staff members and students alike.

4. Captain Brown cannot, it is felt, act as an instructor or lecturer since his command of the English language is totally inadequate; as a matter of fact his English is exceeded in lack of clarity only by his French, supposedly his native language.

5. Captain Brown, because of his restriction to the area will be a psychological problem as well, since his proclivities among the members of the opposite sex are well known.

6. It is understood that nothing can be done about this situation; we will take care of Captain Brown as well as we can under the circumstances. Nevertheless it seems imperative that the Security Branch and other interested Branches be made cognizant of the fact that the officers of MA cannot be held responsible for the security of the special OSS devices used in training, or information given in various lectures, or the installations, or the personnel involved in training, or plans that may be discussed informally among the staff members after Captain Brown arrives.

7. It seems paradoxical, if not completely nonsensical, that two men, both of them enthusiastic and completely American, whose loyalty and motivation cannot be questioned, are held in AF, pending security check, while Captain Brown, whose name is not his own and who was sent back to the United States because of the possibility of his endangering the Allied cause, is ordered to MA.

PHILIP K. ALLEN
Major, FA

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OSS Form 2202

SECRET

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

Lt Duggan

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Col Buxton					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with the number in To column.
A line should be drawn through sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mail insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or reason therefor should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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SECRET

15 July 1944

TO: Major George B. Riggin, Adjutant

FROM: William E. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, ASN O-2056111

1. In accordance with your request of the 12th of July, the following information is submitted to assist in obtaining discharge and demobilization for subject officer:-

(a) Subject officer is not a citizen of the U. S.
(b) He was commissioned by OSS in Algiers on 29 June 1943.
(c) Subject officer had been assigned as undercover agent for operations in occupied France. His duties involved the establishment of radio communication chains between resistance groups and OSS Headquarters, Algiers.

2. Due to extenuating circumstances surrounding his activities, it has been found advisable to withdraw him from occupied France, and return him to Washington for conferences which he has been engaged in for a period of some months. Because of the above circumstances, and as a result of the conferences held, it was decided that it would be impractical to send Brown back into the field for this organization. Adequate consideration has been given to the matter in arriving at this decision. Brown has been informed of this, and advised to request discharge. Security Office endorses this procedure, and instructions have been issued by the General's office to effect Brown's departure from the United States on or about September 1st, with discharge and mobilization to occur in Algiers.

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

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SECRET

13 July 1944

TO: Captain E. R. Gaskill

FROM: William E. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, ASN O-2056111

1. Attached hereto is a travel request for subject officer, who has been assigned to temporary duty at the West Coast Training School.

2. It is estimated that temporary duty will terminate some time during the latter part of August.

3. I have been instructed by General Donovan, through Mr. Joseph M. Scribner, to do everything possible to expedite subject officer's departure. It is, therefore, urgently requested that every effort be made to schedule his departure on or about the 15th of July.

4. Will you kindly notify the undersigned as soon as these orders have been completed, so that Brown may be informed, and depart immediately?

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

Enc. 2

SECRET

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13 July 1944

TO: Lt. John Cowley, C/O North America

FROM: William E. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, ASN O-2054111

1. The undersigned has been requested by General Donovan, through Mr. Joseph P. Spellman, to make arrangements for the subject officer's entry into the West Coast Training School at Catalina Island.

2. Subject officer will be on temporary duty at that station until such temporary duty orders are revoked. It is estimated that revocation will be effected the latter part of August, at which time he will be recalled to Washington, for transportation to Algiers.

3. Brown will not be assigned to the West Coast School as a trainee, but will be assigned there as an observer.

4. The details of this temporary duty assignment have been cleared with Colonel Robinson, Schools and Training.

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

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OSS Form 2202

SECRET

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

Lt Keegan

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. Mr Scribner					
2.		July 11 5:10		C&R.	
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be noted in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to originator.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet

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11 July 1944

TO: Major Oliver,
Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment

FROM: William E. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown, ASN o-2056111

1. Confirming telephone conversation with you this date, it is requested that subject officer be discharged from the U. S. Army in Algiers.

2. Subject officer was returned to Washington from the field when it was found that his usefulness to OSS had terminated. This matter has been the subject of numerous memoranda and correspondence which I should be pleased to make available to you should such reference be required.

3. This branch has been instructed by General Donovan, through Mr. Joseph M. Scribner, Deputy Director SSO, to initiate steps which will result in subject officer's discharge, to occur in Algiers at a date after September 1, 1944.

4. Captain Brown in the meantime will be sent on temporary duty orders to the West Coast Training School on Catalina Island.

5. Will you kindly instruct the undersigned as to what action is necessary to accomplish, or to consummate the General's orders:

(a) Discharge and demobilization in Algiers
(b) Preparation of orders and travel priority from Washington to place of demobilization
(c) Further action, if any, required of this branch.

WILLIAM E. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR
Deputy Chief, SO

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(COPY)

SECRET

11 July 1944

TO: Major Dale O. Allison, Training Officer SSO

FROM: William K. Duggan

SUBJECT: Captain Frederic Brown

1. I have been instructed by Mr. Jorjorian to initiate Captain Frederic Brown's entry into the West Coast schools. It is General Donovan's wish that subject officer be assigned for temporary duty on the West Coast while he is awaiting the necessary action by Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, who are arranging for his discharge from the U. S. Army, which discharge will be consummated in Algiers.

2. Subject officer will not enter the schools as a student, but it is hoped that he will be allowed to relate his OSS activities to classes in session during his stay there. It is also hoped that he will be allowed to engage in any other activities, subject of course to the approval of the Commanding Officer, and the policy of the school.

3. The General has ordered that his discharge should not occur before September 1st, so appropriate plans should be made in order that we may meet the time requirement as indicated above.

4. Will you please instruct the undersigned as to the action which will be taken by Schools and Training in obtaining transportation for Brown?

WILLIAM K. DUGGAN
1st Lt, USMCR

(COPY)

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CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

MID 201.
BROWN, Frederic, Capt.

Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & "E" Streets, N. W.,
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Colonel Buxton

Dear Colonel Buxton:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 24 June 1944, concerning Captain Frederic Brown.

The disposition you intend to make of Captain Brown is concurred in and, as suggested in your letter, the American military authorities are being advised concerning his return to Algiers and civilian life, in order that his activities may be observed.

Your summary handling of this matter is appreciated, and should any changes be made in your proposed plan, I would like to be advised.

Sincerely,

CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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SECRET

July 4, 1944

Re:Captain Frederick Brown

I talked with Bill [illegible] re above. Bill considers that we owe Brown something in getting him satisfactorily [illegible].

He says Brown was [illegible] early days.

He says Brown [illegible] hates Germans, very possibly [illegible] to French turn to the U.S. [illegible] the man is emotional, difficult [illegible] quence undisciplined. Example: [illegible] NOT to visit the Maquis Count[illegible] visit them. Also Brown is liable to [illegible] and boastfully.

English say he takes too [illegible] his clandestine activities; hence is apt [illegible] picked up (as one of them) though Brown himself [illegible] moved on.

X-2 (Pfeff) says [illegible] him in England. Did not believe [illegible] but unstable and indiscreet.

State evidence given by Regis Foster (Brussels). Show letter to [illegible] following my two telephone conversations with Bissell concerning Brown.

Eddy told Brown we might not be able to get him back right away and that his usefulness was probably over.

Eddy would favor following, in order shown:

1. Get Pentcoff to take him to fight Japs in Indo China. (This may be simply passing on a hot potato).

2. [illegible] him to his home town, 50 miles from Algiers after returning him to civilian life in North Africa and taking certain written security statements from him.

3. Give him a long leave in Canada among French Canadians until the war is considered

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to have completely br-negated A rig[illegible]
ut him b[illegible]

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CONFIDENTIAL

29 June 1944

Major General Clayton Bissell
AC of S, G-2
War Department General Staff
Room 2E800
Pentagon Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Bissell:

In response to your letter of 23 June 1944, we are very glad to tell you of the action we propose to take with regard to Captain Frederick Brown.

The original plan some weeks ago was to turn him over for combat purposes to the French, who wanted him. This proved to be impracticable. We have just now, by agreement with the French Military Mission, withdrawn him from detached service with them. We now plan to send him to North Africa, where he was recruited and commissioned. On his arrival he will be immediately restored to civilian life by arrangement to be made with the Theater Commander.

Captain Brown will retire to his home eighty miles from Algiers, where his family is located. He has agreed, in writing, to hold no communication with any representatives of Allied Governments. He formerly owned a business in his home town outside of Algiers and presumably he will resume it.

Our X-2 Branch in North Africa will be instructed to keep an eye on him, and we would of course be glad if your people in that area also were advised concerning this officer.

We would be very glad to receive any comments you may care to make in regard to this plan.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Doering:LMcG

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CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

[illegible] SERVICE DIVISION G-2

WASHINGTON

[illegible]

Director,
Office of Strategic Services
[illegible] 37th St., N.W.
Washington, D. C.

ATTENTION: Col. [illegible]

Dear Colonel [illegible]:

[illegible]

Sincerely,

J. Clayton Russell

[illegible]

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26 June 1944

The Commanding Officer
French Military Mission
1759 R Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Captain Frederic Brown
A.S.N. 0-20 6111

Dear Sir:

In accordance with recent developments, it has become apparent that the original plan for the use of the subject officer, who was placed on detached service with your mission 10 May 1944, is not to be immediately implemented.

We are, therefore, in accordance with your discussion with Lieutenant Duggan, recalling him for duty and further assignment by this office, and have initiated appropriate orders.

We would like to assure you of our appreciation of your cooperation in connection with the proposed assignment of this officer, and regret it is not possible to carry out the original plan.

Sincerely yours,

G. EDWARD BUXTON
Acting Director

JMS/mmp

cc. Mr. Scribner - 2108 Que
Lieut. Duggan - 2111 Que

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The Director, OSS

23 June 1944

Frederic Brown, Captain, AUS

Discharge

I, Frederic Brown, Captain AUS, on 22 June 1944 had a conversation with Colonel Eddy, my recruiting and Commanding Officer for all my missions in North Africa, Corsica and France, in the hotel Statler, Washington, D. C. As a result of this conversation it was decided that there is no further need for me in the United States Army and we agreed that the Office of Strategic Services should send me to Algiers and discharge me in Algiers, where I was mobilized. Colonel Eddy asks especially that I am to be discharged in the same place, Algiers, because if I were discharged here in Washington, I would not be able to get back to my home in Algiers as a civilian. This is the only thing that I ask from OSS prior to my discharge.

Colonel Eddy now feels that my usefulness in the United States Army has expired since we have discovered that as an American officer I cannot be sent to the French underground because the French will not permit any but French officers to enter France. This is the reason for my being recruited--entry into France--and since this is not possible, I am no longer useful to this organization and Colonel Eddy counsels me that I be discharged from the Army immediately upon my arrival at APHQ in Algiers. It is not necessary that I be transported to Algiers by air; travel by sea will suffice.

In addition to my uselessness, I am also tired because I have done four years work in the underground and I have been in the United States service for three years. Therefore, I would like to go back to my family and my former occupation in private business in North Africa.

I hereby declare that I will be available at any time to OSS in North Africa when I am needed; that I will not enter into any other army or political organization and I will not associate myself with French, English or other intelligence organizations or any other organizations; and that I will keep secret all I have learned in my affiliation with OSS. I declare also that as a security measure for four months after my discharge I will go to my home eighty miles west of Algiers to Douraya to prevent my coming in contact with people.

I hope I and all my family have proved my loyalty to the United States. Two of my best friends, recruited by me, lost their lives in the performance of work for OSS. You will recall that I did not seek OSS but it was the OSS that looked for and found me in the darkest time in the United States story. I have done my duty to the satisfaction of the United States Government and I do not expect any

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future advantage from my officer rank and my services; no money, no citizenship or any later advantage from the United States. I wish to explain that I do not seek any personal credit or advantage for what I have done but I wish to remain known only as a Patriot working for French-American friendship.

All that I have said above is irrevocable and I believe this will be respected.

Respectfully,

Frederic Prem
Captain, AUS
MID, Washington

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The following is a summary of my services with OSS:

1) Under orders from the Honorable R. D. Murphy, U. S. Minister, and later of Col. Eddy, Naval attache at Tangier thereafter commanding OSS Algiers, I organized the system of secret radio communications between Algiers and Gibraltar which served the Allied landing operations. I took an active part in the actual landing operations.

2) I organized the first Franco-Anglo-American secret submarine expedition to Corsica (submarine CASABIANCA, December 11, 1942, and went with this expedition into Corsica for the purpose of organizing the first secret radio and intelligence network in that island for the account of OSS, Algiers, who received that intelligence on its receiving station thereafter. I received the Croix de Guerre from the French CIC for this action.

3) I organized a second expedition into Corsica for the account of OSS, shipping 1,000 sub-machine guns into Corsica. I continued into France where I landed on February 5, 1943 with 2 W/T sets for OSS which I installed, creating at the same time an intelligence network which we developed later.

4) I returned to France a second time on June 19, 1943 by parachute with other W/T sets, and developed this intelligence chain which, incidentally, supplied some of the information required for the first bombardment of Istres and Salon. During this mission I had the pleasure of killing five Gestapo men, two on July 9, three on October 4. I organized a pouch service for OSS via Spain which required my crossing the Pyrenees three times before I finally left France on October 17, 1943.

Respectfully,

Frederic Brown
Captain, AUS

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Form 2202

FROM: C/ Doering

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. .....

Date Rec'd. SA.....

To	Room No.	Date Rec'd.	Date Fwd'd.	Officer's Initials	Comments
1. WH					
2. AVB					
3. C/ Doering					1 to 3 - Please note copy of my memo of 7 June to Maj. Hoffman WH
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					
10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designations should be used in To column.
Each Officer should initial across or near (if insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
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For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE June 1944

FROM

SUBJECT

[illegible] is a copy [illegible] setting up the new committee. I do not know [illegible] active they are at the present. You will [illegible] that their commission at this point is to explore the situation and to make recommendations for permanent machinery.

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SECRET

Major Carl C. Hoffman
Security Office
A.C.S., [illegible]

SECRETARIAT
1944 JUN 8 PM 3 47
OSS

7th June, 1944

1. With reference to your memorandum of [illegible], addressed to Col. Buxton concerning the subject, I [illegible] a copy of my memorandum of 31st May to Col. [illegible], which is self-explanatory.

2. Col. Buxton has approved the recommendations made in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my memorandum of 31st May and the matter is referred to you for appropriate action.

3. This office will be glad to assist in preparing the information suggested under paragraph 5 as soon as we are informed that the steps relating to subject's transfer have been completed.

Buxton Howland
Security Officer

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Col. G. J. Doering

FROM : Leston Rowland

SECRETARIAT DATE

1944 JUN 1 PM 12 02

SUBJECT Captain Frederic Brown

OSS

1. You have referred [illegible] Major Carl Hoffmann to Col. Huston, [illegible] and to Capt. Brown's disposition. [illegible] are [illegible] another solution to [illegible] developed.

2. Capt. Brown [illegible] excellent work for the Office of Strategic Services. Part of his work was [illegible] was valuable. Part of [illegible] not mature and was cause of concern to all Intelligence agencies in MTOTO.

3. This officer has a basic trait which will probably always vitiate his efforts as part of an [illegible] system. He is an [illegible] person. Countering this [illegible] are [illegible] limit, great accuracy, quick [illegible] situations, and broad knowledge of Europe.

4. It is the recommendation of this office that an effort be made to muster this man [illegible] Training Center; that an arrangement [illegible] made to [illegible] him as a training officer for a [illegible]; that [illegible] cautioned for appropriate [illegible] with Washington. Following this formula will [illegible] this [illegible] war effort the best use of his many qualifications, with all practical [illegible] security hazards as [illegible].

5. Appropriate arrangements should be made to entirely inform Intelligence section of the training center to which he is transferred, of the special circumstances involved.

[illegible]
Security Officer

SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL

Pers. Security 19138

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

20 May 1944

To: Colonel G. Edward Buxton

From: Major Carl O. Hoffmann

Subject: Captain Frederick Drown

1. I refer you to cable #35944, Glavin to Donovan, information Hoffmann and Buxton. The Security Officer worked long and hard on reviewing the problem of the subject officer's security.

2. With the consent of Mr. Howland of Security and Shephardson of SI, I drew up a proposal concerning the subject officer. This was signed by Shephardson and Howland, approved by General Donovan and was sent to the field.

3. When General Donovan approved the proposal he made one modification, to wit, subject officer should be assigned to the French Mission in Washington and not in Algiers.

4. OPD refused to clear any OSS officer for air transportation at the request of the French and we were asked to apply for sea transportation.

5. The cable makes such a strong case that I am sure that General Donovan will reverse his earlier decision.

6. I believe it would be a great mistake to transfer the subject officer back to the Army even if it were possible. There is nothing further I can do with the subject officer. I know of no secure place that OSS has for cases of this alleged type.

7. May I have your instructions?

CARL O. HOFFMANN
Major, AUS,
Chief, SO

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OSS
Form 69 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE May 28, 1944

FROM

USTRAVIC, LONDON

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

[illegible]

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16 [illegible]

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

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#42511. From [illegible]
(#13101 to Algiers.)

In the light of Clavin's [illegible] marked harmful reaction on [illegible] operations, it is my opinion that Clavin's objections to the return of [illegible] should be honored; consequently, he will not be stirred. [illegible] another answer to this problem.

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DR: 5/28/44 6:50 P.M.

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OSS
Form no (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

FROM

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

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(FOR INFORMATION)

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

FROM EXILE, ALGIERS TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES REF NO 25014

RECEIVED

SECRET

(5) Our ability to maintain either our independence or security would be greatly understood by Captain Brown's returning for duty in this theatre where he would be under our supervision. (6) In the event security violations did occur, it would be necessary for us to take steps to confine the Captain. Such action would be a source of embarrassment to us throughout. In view of all these facts, we strongly advise that you issue orders to Washington to keep Brown in the United States until the end of the war and if necessary, order his incarceration for reasons of security. If Brown has already departed and we cannot stop his coming here, it is our intention to hold him on the inactive list until we receive your answer.

ACTION COPY

DTG: 5/27/44 2:47 p.m.

SECRET

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Major Donovan

J. P. Macaulay

Capt. Fredrick Boorn

With regard to the attached matter, General Donovan has the following comment:

"I feel not desirable to talk to the Bermudians regarding our facilities here and at their request"

J. P. Macaulay

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SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Name	Date
O. C. Doering, Jr.	
C. A. Bane	
J. B. Donovan	
D. C. Lee	
G. S. Platt	
P. F. Pogliese	
F. J. Putzell, Jr.	
A. W. Sullaway	
R. Tirrun	
Files	

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3/30

8 April 1944.

General Donovan.

Major Duncan C. Lee.

Captain Brown.

This is in response to your request for a report on Captain Brown. I have talked to Mr. Rowland who advises me as follows:

(1) Captain Brown has been in this country for the past two weeks and Mr. Rowland is now preparing him to teach at the "Arent School". This preparation consists chiefly of brushing up his radio. Mr. Rowland feels that for the time being Captain Brown can make a most valuable contribution as an instructor and that this plan serves the further purpose of getting him out of Washington as soon as possible.

(2) The X-2 report on Captain Brown of which Colonel Bruce refers has not yet arrived. However, Mr. Rowland says that its conclusion is that neither SO, SIS, MI, nor X-2 believe Brown to be a double agent. Meanwhile, the Security Office is keeping a close watch on him.

(3) Mr. Rowland reports that Brown has been over to X-2 which is trying to get as much information from him as possible.

(4) Mr. Rowland feels that after tour of teaching at our schools here, it will probably appear desirable to have Brown proceed to some other theater for further operations.

D.C.L.

DCLee:rlc

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August 31, 1943

Captain Gordon H. Browne
Marion, Massachusetts

Dear Captain Browne:

It was with the greatest of pleasure that I learned of your receiving the Silver Star Medal for outstanding bravery and heroism.

Your assignments in North Africa with this organization were at all times handled in a superior manner, and your placing duty before personal safety in the face of danger was highly commendable.

As Director of this organization, it gives me much personal satisfaction to congratulate you on your award which was well earned and richly deserved.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director

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1 November 1944

201 Browne, Gordon H. (O)
Zurlo, Angelo A. (O)

SUBJECT: Relief from Active Duty.

TO : Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WDGS

1. It is recommended that Captain Gordon H. Browne, O-925579, AUS and First Lieutenant Angelo A. Zurlo, 0821874, AUS, who are now assigned to Office of Strategic Services, be relieved from active duty. This request is made with the consent of subject officers as their assignments have been completed.

2. A brief description of each case is inclosed and action is respectfully requested either collectively or individually.

3. The reasons for this request are as follows:

a. In the earlier part of 1943, OSS was requested to recruit a number of individuals for special secret activities in the then contemplated various campaigns. The type of individuals to be recruited constituted a scarce and difficult category. It was necessary to recruit men who were completely familiar with the territory involved, who spoke the language fluently and who were willing to volunteer for an extremely hazardous task.

b. None of the subject officers was in the Army at the time.

c. At the request of OSS these men were commissioned in the Army of the United States for specific missions. Their commissioning was necessary because of the nature of the assignments and to provide adequate security in operations.

4. Although these men were ideally suited for the particular task for which they were recruited, there exists no suitable assignment for them in OSS at this time. It is not contemplated that there will be any change in this condition.

5. Request authority to handle future cases of similar type such as authority granted per paragraph 2, 1st Indorsement, letter AGPE-A-WDGAP 220.8 (8 September 1944).

CHARLES S. CHESROW
Assistant Director

Attachments (2)

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NAME:	BROWNE, Gordon M.
RANK:	Captain
ARMY SERIAL NUMBER:	O-925579
DATE OF COMMISSION:	29 October 1943
DATE OF BIRTH:	7 March 1901 (age 43)
HISTORY:	Commission secured by OSS. Commission was obtained because of specific foreign area knowledge in connection with mission of confidential nature. Mission fully accomplished.

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NAME:	ZUPLO, Angelo A.
RANK:	First Lieutenant
ARMY SERIAL NUMBER:	0521874
DATE OF COMMISSION:	5 May 1943
DATE OF BIRTH:	17 January 1908 (age 36)
HISTORY:	Commission secured by OSS. Commission was obtained because of specific foreign area knowledge in connection with mission of confidential nature. Mission fully accomplished.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

13 March 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: General William J. Donovan

FROM: J. M. Scribner

SUBJECT: Captain Gordon Browne

As you know, Captain Browne is one of the older OSS officers from the standpoint of service, and you may remember he was working in Bari under the direction of the Strategic Services Officer, Middle East, during the period from November, 1943, until January, 1944.

For one reason or another, he has returned from the Theater and in talking with me today expressed a very strong desire to talk to you personally. This memorandum is forwarded with the request that you see Captain Browne at your convenience.

Your secretary may reach him at extension 2530 if you see fit to grant this interview. 2305

Tell him certainly

J. M. Scribner
Deputy Director, SSO

I have discussed with Captain Browne the matter of his appointment with you. I do not think he should be recalled for personal interview. I will arrange his appointment with Mr. Lovett.

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Mrs Putzell

This has only just come into this office. It was sent to Stafford Neal's office by mistake but they do not know where from.

CKittredge

Chas Chester -

Director's Office

(3308)

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Washington, October 4

Dear General Donovan:

I have accepted a commission as a captain and expect to proceed to Cairo shortly. My application for a majority was turned down by the Craig Board due to a recent ruling limiting my age group (44) to the rank of captain when appointed from civilian status. This was in spite of the fact that I was offered a majority in Morocco in January I was unable to accept due to the necessity of my remaining in Tangier, and that a commendation from the 5th Army was brought before the Board.

I fear that I annoyed Mr. Chester when I stated that it was my opinion that field men should have been protected from such arbitrary rulings. I not only feel this to be true, but I also believe that exceptions should be made and carried as high as possible.

While I appreciate the opportunity of being actively engaged in the war effort through the O. S. S. I am very much disappointed that twenty months service has resulted in a reduction of rank upon my being commissioned and that a limitation has thereby been placed on the type of work in which I can engage.

Gordon Brauer

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HEADQUARTERS
NORTH AFRICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 534

AG 201-AGP-Brown, Gordon (Civ) /jm 20 July 1943

SUBJECT: Orders

TO : Commanding Officer, Experimental Detachment G-3 (Prov), WDGS

1. Mr. Gordon Brown, employee of Experimental Detachment G-3 (Prov), is authorized to proceed on or about 22 July 1943 from this station to Washington, D. C., for the purpose of consultation and conferences in connection with OSS activities. Travel by military aircraft and/or rail is authorized.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/s/ FRANK A. PARKER,
1st Lt., A.G.D.,
Asst. Adj. Gen.

DISTRIBUTION:

Mr. Brown ---------- 2
Exp Det G-3 (Prov) -- 1
Air Priorities G-4 -- 2
201 File ---------- 1

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING Q
WASHINGTON D C

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Statement of [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Subscribed [illegible]
before me this 18
of [illegible], 1961.

[illegible]

EXHIBIT "B"

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DEPARTMENT "A"
HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING, Q
WASHINGTON D C

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

I was [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING Q
WASHINGTON D. C.

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EXHIBIT "A"

HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING Q
WASHINGTON D C

[redacted]

[redacted]

AFF 201.22.

I, Albert R. Materazzi, [redacted]
in command of Group 5, [redacted]
start of a [redacted]
knives were to remain [redacted]
issued for [redacted]
approximately [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
green, red, [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted]

Albert R. Materazzi

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this 18 day
of May, 1944.

Emmanuel Klaw
Lt. Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

EXHIBIT "A"

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING "Q"
WASHINGTON D. C.

18

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
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WASHINGTON D C

Lt. Col., Inf., USA

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047, BUILDING "Q"
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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HEADQUARTERS & HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
ROOM 2047 BUILDING Q
WASHINGTON D C

The project started at [illegible]
1943. [illegible] was ordered by [illegible]
Lieutenant [illegible] to [illegible] and
brought [illegible]
has been [illegible]
bridge [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Subscribed and sworn to
before me this 4th day
of May, 1943.

[illegible]
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry
Commanding.

EXHIBIT "W"

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Russell B. Wiseman

EXHIBIT "L"

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[illegible] Washington, D. C.

Autopsy No. 3226.
(Gen. No. 195742)

Name : Brown, Merle C., 3019286.
Pvt., Det. F, OSS.
White male. Age 24 years.
Died : on 11, 1943 at [illegible] at Bier Echo, [illegible].
Autopsied: at 24, 1943 at 12: [illegible].
Prosector: Lot Lt. [illegible] Randall, [illegible].
Diagnosis as issued by Medical Examiner, [illegible]
County, Maryland: [illegible]
over area of [illegible].

Gross Autopsy Findings.

[illegible]:
1. [illegible] wound, right ventricle, [illegible] surface, severe.
2. [illegible], diaphragm, region of central tendon.
3. [illegible], severe, secondary to No. 2.
4. Hemorrhage, [illegible] lesser peritoneal cavity, [illegible] secondary to No. 2.
5. Stab wound, left anterior chest wall, precordial region.

Basic Cause of Death.

Stab wound of heart.

EXHIBIT "M"

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AUTOPSY No. 2206.
Brown, [illegible].

External.

The body is that of a normally developed, [illegible] approximately 25 to 30 years of age, [illegible] weighing approximately 150 lbs. The head [illegible] abnormalities. The eyelids are [illegible] there is marked cyanosis about the lips, nec[illegible] There is a 2 x 1 cm. stab wound, 2.5 cm. medial to [illegible] 6 cm. medial to [illegible] lies in the outer aspect of the left upper arm. [illegible] are distended. The extremities present [illegible] rigor rigidity and marked [illegible].

[illegible].

The thoracic and abdominal [illegible] moderate ecchymosis [illegible] wound. The peritoneal surface [illegible] There is no increase of fluid [illegible] The liver, spleen and kidneys are [illegible] enlarged. There are approximately [illegible] ser peritoneal cavity. There are [illegible] small amount of clear fluid. [illegible] pericardial [illegible] heart [illegible] diaphragm [illegible] above the inferior vena [illegible] tendon.

[illegible].

Heart: Weighs 270 grams. The epicardial surface shows [illegible] fat. The right ventricle measures [illegible] portion, measuring 3 cm. and the anterior [illegible] the upper portion of right ventricle. The myocardium [illegible] ing of significance. The valves are [illegible] ficies are [illegible]. The coronary arteries are thin [illegible]

Aorta: Shows [illegible] of significance.

Lungs: The right weighs 625, the left 450 grams. The external surface of each is [illegible], varigh-white to [illegible] purple. The cut surface shows

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slight to moderate congestion throughout the lower lobes. The [illegible] mediastinal nodes show nothing of significance.

ABDOMEN.

Liver: Weighs 1713 grams. Over the [illegible] there is moderate diffusion of blood extending along the falciform, coronary and triangular ligaments. There is dissection posteriorly and inferiorly in the region of the transverse fissure where blood freely escapes into the peritoneal cavity. The remainder of the external surface of the organ shows nothing of significance. The cut surface [illegible]. The gall bladder contains approximately 20 c.c. of [illegible] bile. Probe passed through the ampulla. There is moderate diffusion of blood [illegible].

Spleen: Weighs 197 grams. The external capsule is [illegible]. The cut surface shows nothing of gross significance.

Gastro-intestinal tract: The stomach is filled with [illegible] fluid. The intestinal tract throughout [illegible].

Pancreas: Weighs 94 grams. Shows nothing [illegible].

Adrenals: The combined weight is approximately [illegible] gm. Sections show nothing of gross significance.

Kidneys: [illegible] weigh 147, the left 160 grams. The [illegible] of each is normal in size and medullary shadow. The cortical surface is [illegible], shows marked arteriosclerosis. The cortex is generally [illegible].

Urinary bladder: [illegible] appears normal. [illegible] mucosa is normal.

Prostate: Shows nothing of gross significance.

ETC.

The structures of the neck, including the [illegible], show nothing [illegible].

H. E. D.

Not examined.

TOXICOLOGY:

Blood alcohol negative.

H. E. Randall
H. E. Randall, M.D.
Medical Examiner
Toxicologist.

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Ernest Alexander
Navy Dept. [illegible]

May 26, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subject: Alexander B. Brook.

1. Mr. Brock is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.

3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.

4. Mr. Brock is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 20-42.

5. The nature of Mr. Brock's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.

6. Mr. Brock's address is:

Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan.

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May 26, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services.
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subject: Alexander B. Brock.

1. Mr. Brock is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.

2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.

3. If qualified for appointment and is accepted, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.

4. Mr. Brock is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 28-42.

5. The nature of Mr. Brock's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.

6. Mr. Brock's address is:

Office of Strategic Services.
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan.

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SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

NOT TO BE ACCESSIONED

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[redacted] RESTRICTED
[redacted] HEADQUARTERS
[redacted] UNITED KINGDOM BASE
[redacted] APO 413, US ARMY

AF/1s

AG 200.6 L-2150

29 Apr 19[redacted]

SUBJECT: Orders

TO: LT COL RICHARD L. BROOKER, IC, British Army

1. Officer named above, Hq & Hq Det, OSS, European TO, will proceed on or about 8 May 1945, by surface T, from pres station to the United States, reporting upon arrival to the Director, OSS, Washington, D.C., (Overseas Reception Office, Room 110, 25th and E Streets, N.W.), for TDY of approx ninety (90) days, and upon completion of this duty will return to present station.

2. Attention is invited to classified letter, Hq European TO, 16 Sep 1943, file AG 311.4, relative to clearance through customs on leaving and entering the United States.

3. Reimbursement for the expense incurred in connection with this travel will be made to the War Dept by the Office of Strategic Services. The Finance Officer making payment in connection with the travel performed will submit a copy of the voucher showing the amount paid, month in which paid, voucher number and citation of this order by letter to the Adjutant General's Department, Washington, D.C., attention Fiscal Section, stating that one inclosed copy of the voucher is furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement from the Office of Strategic Services.

4. Information concerning the War Dept, army or personal activities of a military nature within this theater will not be discussed in private or public, and will not be disclosed by means of newspapers, magazines, books, lectures or radio, or any other method without prior clearance through the WD Bureau of Public Relations or the appropriate Public Relations Officers of Army Installations.

5. TCNT. TDN. 60-135 500 P 432-02-03 A 212/50425.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL KOENIG:

[redacted] Allen Freeman

[redacted] FREEMAN,
[redacted] USA,
[redacted] Adjutant General

DIS[redacted]
TA[redacted]

Lt Col Brooker (1)
Off Br [redacted]
AG Record[redacted]
AG [redacted]

[redacted] RESTRICTED

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(25)

5 February 1944

Colonel Louis [illegible]
British Security Coordination
Room 3605
630 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Colonel [illegible]:

Lt. Commander [illegible]
Colonel Crosby [illegible]
pursuant to the request from [illegible]
in that city.

[illegible] the sincere appreciation of this agency for the courteous loan of Colonel Crosby's services. [illegible] of real use to Commander [illegible] as long as available. We shall [illegible] and you to know of our appreciation for his efforts in helping us.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Acting Director

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5 February 1944

Mr. [illegible]
Director, Security Coordination
c/o Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Bill:

Recently Colonel [illegible] was one of the personnel from [illegible] for [illegible] services in that city. We have completed the assignment that [illegible] been sent to our office so [illegible], and are grateful for the opportunity to have benefitted by his valuable assistance.

Let me again express our appreciation for the [illegible] Colonel Crocker's experience and ability.

Very sincerely,

[illegible] Buxton
Acting Director

EJP:mW

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

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SECRET

10 September 1945

SUBJECT: Promotion of Lt. Comdr. Charles C. Busenkell, USNR, 116-706

TO : Chief of Naval Personnel

THRU : (1) Commanding Officer, Naval Command
(2) Commanding Officer, N.A.M.U.

1. It is recommended that Lt. Commander Charles C. Busenkell be promoted to the rank of Commander, USNR.

2. Lt. Commander Busenkell has been on duty with this command since 16 October 1944, and is Officer in Charge of the Electronics Section, Special Projects Office, Office of Strategic Services. Under his command are approximately ten officers and eighty enlisted men, all highly trained technicians, engaged in this classified activity.

3. Subject officer is entirely responsible for the installation, operation and maintenance of classified radio control, radar and television equipment, including AAF television transmitting equipment, automatic boat pilots, radar beacons, control receivers, electronics equipment, flux gate compasses, electric generators for this gear, Mark IV firing devices, Mark XIV and Mark IX demolitions charges, time delay fuses, Loran gear, and all communications equipment used by the project.

4. The purpose of this project, to which Lt. Commander Busenkell is assigned, is to attack enemy shipping and other appropriate targets by means of crewless explosive-laden boats controlled by a radio link from aircraft flying beyond range of vision. The controllers on the aircraft observe the progress of the boats by television, and guide them in a manner similar to the way Razon bombs are guided.

5. This project necessitates the use of the above named equipment on 85 ft. air-sea rescue boats which are used as guided missiles, and B-17 four-engine bombers, which are used for control aircraft. The technical aspects of this missile have been worked out by this office.

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Promotion of Lt. Comdr. Charles C. Busenkell, USNR
10 September 1945

and plans were actually under way for introduction into the Pacific theater, when hostilities ceased. The project has been operating as a joint OSS-AAF activity. Lt. Commander Busenkell is presently working with the Army Air Forces, which is continuing with the project. Through the untiring efforts and experimentation with this equipment, Lt. Commander Busenkell is responsible for many modifications which have greatly increased the range and effectiveness of this guided missile.

6. Subject officer was graduated from Villanova College in 1932 with an ME Degree, and was employed as an engineer by the Brown Instrument Company, Philadelphia, Pa. Lt. Commander Busenkell entered the service in August, 1941, and as a Lieutenant (jg) reported for active duty 22 September 1941. He was promoted to Lieutenant on 10 June 1942, and his present rank dates from 13 March 1944.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Director.

Incl: 1
Organ. Chart-
Electronics Section

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TIME

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TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 20

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

May 9, 1945

Brigadier General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I am to be in Washington next week and wonder whether you could see me. I have been making a study of the strategy of World War III which I find very interesting if depressing. I think one way to avert World War III is to get a prompt settlement of the Japanese war. I would like to talk to you and anybody else you might suggest in the OSS on these subjects. Don't bother answering this letter; I shall telephone you for an appointment.

Sincerely yours,

Raymond T. Buell

P.S. In case you haven't seen it I enclose a memorandum we recently published on the San Francisco Conference.

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DUMBARTON OAKS AND SAN FRANCISCO

An analysis of the Proposals together with suggestions for improvements to be made in the drafting of the Charter of a World Security Organization.

This report was written by the undersigned as part of the continuing wartime study of international problems made by the editors of TIME, LIFE, and FORTUNE.

HENRY R. LUCE
JOHN SHAW BILLINGS
RAYMOND LESLIE BUELL
JOHN DAVENPORT
JOHN K. JESSUP
JOHN OSBORNE

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WHAT'S PAST IS PROLOGUE

If the world organization analyzed on the following pages of this pamphlet comes into being, it will be the work of many men and of many minds. It will also be the peculiar result of the last few tremendous years in which America has emerged if not as the leader at least as the greatest single power of a coalition of nations large and small.

The American architect of that coalition is now dead. Whatever his mistakes, his achievement towers immense. It fell to Mr. Roosevelt long before the U.S. was at war to lead his country into two momentous decisions. One was to stand at all costs for the preservation of Britain and reassert America's traditional interest in Anglo-American hegemony of the Atlantic. The other was to stand with Russia, whose defection from the Western world in and after World War I played its part in bringing on World War II.

By reason of those decisions the United Nations came into being almost on the instant of America's active entrance into the war. From that time forward Mr. Roosevelt never let up in his attempt to hold the basic coalition together. The exhausting conferences of Washington, Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, Quebec and Yalta were milestones along the way. The day before his death Mr. Roosevelt was preparing his itinerary for San Francisco. He died on duty.

The fact that the present proposal for a world organization grows out of a coalition of powers, and particularly out of the coalition of three powers, explains both its strength and its weaknesses. This is no time to underrate the weaknesses. Even less is it a time to underrate its potential strength. Rather it is a time to attempt to build better. Mr. Roosevelt would be the last to believe that everything has been accomplished, both for him as for the American destiny. ". . . what's past is prologue, what to come, in yours and my discharge."

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DUMBARTON OAKS AND SAN FRANCISCO

Dumbarton Oaks is not good enough and never was: San Francisco can and should do better.

I AN AMERICAN PREFACE TO THE POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE

The American people are in favor of joining a world organization to keep the peace. So are we, the editors of FORTUNE.

The American people are also in favor of [illegible] many years of naval and military establishments more powerful than that of any other nation. These [illegible] usually mentioned by those who speak [illegible] world security organization. We mention [illegible] because we believe that only if the [illegible] are put together is it possible to talk sensibly and [illegible] about the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

One of the things we learn from putting the two propositions together is that the American people do not rely on the world organization to keep the peace in the foreseeable future. A realistic recognition of this example of popular good sense eliminates at one stroke most of the hypocrisy and all the [illegible] that have given an odor of staleness to much [illegible] in our time.

But these two propositions [illegible] tell us something else. They tell us that the American people [illegible] maintain their own military [illegible] of the world. The force of [illegible] Dumbarton Oaks [illegible] ships [illegible] and bases [illegible] organization are the most [illegible] for the success without these [illegible] countries the American people cannot be counted on to [illegible] effective international [illegible] to military [illegible] are needed to deter.

We learn yet a third thing by putting these two propositions together - the will to have a world organization and the will to have the mightiest armament. We believe these two [illegible] enough. They cannot be synthesized [illegible] Something is missing. That something is [illegible] policy—a clear statement of foreign [illegible] ment of the U.S. and [illegible] the people.

Granted a clear [illegible] of U.S. foreign policy, then both our position in the world organization *and* [illegible] may be used harmoniously toward common or parallel ends.

This pamphlet does not attempt to outline a correct American foreign policy either in principle or in application. It deals only with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. But unless commentators on Dumbarton Oaks disclose their general position on American foreign policy, their remarks are either hypocritical or meaningless. A few words therefore are necessary to indicate the notions [illegible] of the author [illegible]

American foreign [illegible]

American policy is obviously [illegible] the aim of [illegible] up in [illegible] policy lie in [illegible] political and social development, in [illegible] appreciation of the people and their [illegible] abandoning out of [illegible] their own [illegible]

In the course of decades or [illegible] basic policies [illegible] government [illegible] appropriate to the [illegible] important policies [illegible] the [illegible]

[illegible] assured, in [illegible] law of American [illegible] should [illegible] world, which [illegible] our day [illegible]

[illegible] do not [illegible] the care [illegible] respect of [illegible] policy for [illegible]

[illegible] American [illegible] freedom. [illegible] meeting. There [illegible] the U.S. [illegible] which will [illegible] development of American [illegible] intends to [illegible] other peoples. It does not [illegible] problem at home. It does recognize [illegible] necessary for the U.S. [illegible] with other peoples who [illegible] under law.

As regards our own physical security, the threat to [illegible] any aggressive attempt (such as has been made by Germany and Japan) to dominate Europe or Asia. A policy favoring the political freedom of men and nations is a policy automatically opposed to the domination of one nation by another.

Reprints of this report are available from FORTUNE *in limited quantities on request to the Publ[illegible], 350 Fifth Ave., New York 1.*

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II A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF A VERY WORDY BUSINESS

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are the direct outgrowth of a deep yearning by the American people for some sort of world organization to keep the next peace. The smoke of the attack on Pearl Harbor had barely blown away before the State Department, through its Division of Political Studies, began to collect blueprint material on new peace machinery. By September, 1943, the popular desire to organize the peace in some way was notably reflected by the Republican Postwar Advisory Council, which meeting at Mackinac Island, Michigan, called for "responsible participation by the United States in a postwar cooperative organization among sovereign nations to prevent military aggression and attain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." Two weeks later the House of Representatives adopted (360 to 29) the Fulbright Resolution along the same general lines.

The world organization idea was advanced another major step the following month when Secretary Hull flew to Moscow and met with Foreign Ministers Molotov and Eden. The U.S. Senate quickly swung into step by adopting (85 to 5) the Connally Resolution endorsing the sentiments of the Moscow Declaration on peace machinery.

Such were the diplomatic and political preliminaries to Secretary Hull's invitation (May 30, 1944) to Britain, Russia, and China to meet in Washington for specific discussion of a specific world organization. The meetings, which began August 21, were held at Dumbarton Oaks, a beautiful colonial estate in Georgetown that had belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Robert Woods Bliss, who had given it to Harvard University. It was at the fortcoming Proposals took their name. Because Russia was not at war with Japan, the conference had to be held in two sections, the U.S., Britain, and Russia for the first thirty-nine days, the U.S., Britain, and China for the last nine days. Though the press was rigorously excluded from the conference, Russia's successful standout for absolute veto power over the Organization's actions made frequent headlines. The sessions over, President Roosevelt declared that a "90 per cent agreement had been reached," and Secretary Hull on publishing the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, invited "full study and discussion" of them by the people of all countries.

Meanwhile a presidential campaign was [illegible] the U.S. But both Democrats and Republicans [illegible] conventions had adopted platform planks [illegible] participation in a world organization and both candidates stood firmly on these planks. The Proposals therefore came through the campaign with full bipartisan support.

The whole electorate, in fact, had at first accepted the Proposals with uncritical enthusiasm. But as they were scrutinized in more detail, doubts began to arise. A meeting of Roman Catholic bishops in November approved the [illegible] people of world organization but warned against [illegible] Catholics [illegible] five powerful nations." Labor [illegible] accepted the Proposals as [illegible] urged [illegible] amendments, largely [illegible] colonial peoples. [illegible] the Proposals as they [illegible]

The next [illegible] meeting at Yalta. [illegible] Nations meeting at [illegible] Charter for [illegible] proposed in the [illegible] to return to [illegible] Roosevelt proposed [illegible] Dumbarton Oaks [illegible] The communique also [illegible] ment on voting procedure [illegible] on the Axis by March 1 [illegible] an unseemly scramble [illegible] into the war before the [illegible] number of states entitled [illegible]

Meanwhile the State Dept [illegible] unprecedented publicity [illegible] confidence in the State Department [illegible] subject [illegible] Washington [illegible] suddenly [illegible] stroked [illegible] At Yalta [illegible] demand [illegible] Soviet Republics [illegible] the Assembly. Roosevelt [illegible] provided the U.S. also got [illegible]

Consternation at this [illegible] consequent rift [illegible] deal itself. President Roosevelt [illegible] moved [illegible] Warsaw [illegible] both Britain and the U.S. were [illegible]

In a speech [illegible] Dumbarton Oaks Proposals have [illegible] agreements, compromises, [illegible] perhaps, a good thing [illegible] national attention more sharply [illegible] what was to be done at San Francisco.

III THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS: WHAT THEY ARE

The Proposals drafted at Dumbarton Oaks and filled in at Yalta deal primarily with the structure of a world security Organization. The final Charter of this Organization is to be worked out at San Francisco. According to the proposals the Organization will have four "principal organs": (1) General Assembly; (2) Security Council; (3) International Court of

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...ry, the Secretariat. A fifth, the Economic and Social ...l, may turn out to be another "principal organ" that the ...ls treat as a "subsidiary agency."

The General Assembly, presumably out of deference to ...d opinion as given top billing although it is debunked ...nd in power and importance to the Security Council ...s projected at Dumbarton Oaks the Assembly is to be not a world legislature but an international forum. Every member of the Organization is to be automatically a member of the Assembly free to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security" and to make recommendations on such matters, including the "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments."

The Assembly would take action taken it must appeal to the Security Council. The General Assembly cannot on its own initiative make recommendations on any such matter if it is already being dealt with by the Security Council.

The Assembly can admit new members to the Organization, suspend or expel an offending member and elect the important Secretary General, the chief administrative officer of the Organization. But all of these actions require the "recommendation of the Security Council." This means that the Assembly can accept or reject the views of the Council on such matters but cannot make proposals of its own. In four other respects, however, the Assembly stands on its own feet: it approves the budget of the Organization, elects the six nonpermanent members of the Council and the eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council, supervises subsidiary social and economic agencies and makes recommendations as to cooperation in "political, economic and social fields" without interference from the Security Council. All "important" decisions of the Assembly are to be by two-thirds votes—an advance over League procedure, which required unanimity (except for parties to a dispute). Routine decisions are taken by a simple majority. In the Assembly each state has one vote, subject to possible changes insisted on by the Russian demand for three votes.

The Security Council has eleven members. Five of them—the U.S.S.R., Britain, France, and China—have permanent seats. The other six memberships are elective and temporary.

In the first Council three of the elective members will be chosen by the Assembly for one-year terms, three for two years. Afterward all the elective terms will run two years, three of the six expiring each year. No elected member can have two terms in succession, but a former member can be elected two years after its last term expired.

The drafters of Dumbarton Oaks frankly proposed that the Council, rather than the Assembly, should have "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The Council may (not must) "investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction"; but all members promise to seek a solution to disputes through negotiation, mediation, judicial settlement, or "other peaceful means." The main job of the Council is to press the parties to settle disputes by themselves. Only in the event of failure does the Security Council swing into action. In such a case it has the power to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment." It is not clear from the language used in Article VIII whether the Council can merely suggest to the parties a *method* of settlement or whether it can actually suggest a *solution*. The Council, however, cannot investigate any situation or dispute arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state concerned. In other words, it could come into Malay to intervene in the treatment of the Jews as a "domestic" question in the German sphere, but not in Iran.

If the Council is unable to find a peaceful solution but the Council agrees that a threat to peace has arisen and proceeds to take measures to maintain or restore the "maintenance of international peace and security" it has a variety of powers to choose from, whether political, economic, military, or anything else. All members of the organization must help carry out the decisions of the Security Council—a provision much stronger than the "obligation" in the League Covenant.

An important power of the Security Council, in respect to armaments, is that it would have a Military Staff Committee to advise it. The world Disarmament Conference and the Council on this body only for the first two years, after which they would be expected to make other rules for separate armaments when needed. Dumbarton Oaks calls for no standing international police force, but states that armed forces are to be available to the Security Council by "all members of the Organization" in accordance with special agreements.

The crucial question of the troubled question of the veto power. Russia's veto power, which Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill agreed at Yalta to extend to all procedure that not only concerned the Council's own actions by its permanent members, but would make effective action by the Organization impossible without unanimous consent of the big powers. In short, in any case where the big powers themselves are involved in such action, even of course in a dispute.

Decisions by the Council relating to procedure require the votes of any seven members. In deciding whether a dispute should be investigated, whether the Council should recommend action, and in certain other matters, a far-reaching agreement [illegible] Council action.

The International Court. The Proposals call for an international court of justice. The question is left open whether membership in the World Court should be automatic for members of the United Nations. The Proposals do not prescribe the [illegible] which would be referred to the World Court or to [illegible] but do recommend that the Council should refer justiciable disputes to the International Court of Justice.

The Secretariat will comprise a research and information staff. It would be headed by a Secretary General who would have the right "to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matters which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security." This provision—the only specific mention of a necessary vague paragraph on the Secretariat—would give the Organization's executive an importance far beyond that of the secretariat in the old League.

The Economic and Social Council would be the only body directly subject to the General Assembly. Its function is to carry out the recommendations of the Assembly with respect to international economic, social and cultural welfare, to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and even make recommendations to states with respect to such matters on its own initiative. While it has no power to impose a solution on any state without its consent, it can call international conferences to frame new treaties or make recommendations dealing with any economic or social matter. The members of this Council represent eighteen states elected by the Assembly for three-year terms, which can make decisions by a simple majority.

Regions vs. the World. The Dumbarton Oaks draft enjoins

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the Security Council to encourage and work through "regional arrangements or agencies."

Hard to Amend, Impossible to Resign. One of the most interesting features of the Proposals relates to amendment. They can be adopted by two thirds of the members of the Assembly if ratified by the Big Four and a majority of the other members of the Organization. Thus the U.S. can block any amendment

IV AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS—PLUS AND MINUS

What do the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals add up to?

Not a world organization. A good part of the world, Germany, Japan, Italy, and other enemy and ex-enemy countries, Sweden, Switzerland, and other neutrals are not invited to join, at least at first. It is an Organization of victorious belligerents called the United Nations, forty-six members which represent about 85 per cent of the two billion inhabitants of the globe.

It is not a superstate. The Organization will lack all the vital attributes of sovereignty. It cannot pass laws. It has limited jurisdiction, it has no money of its own unless its chief member states are willing to grant it funds in a crisis. It professes to be "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states," the phrase Stalin insisted on laboring for in Moscow. Not all its members are "peace-loving" as nonmembers Sweden and Switzerland are aware, but of the members is far from perfect, but nobody can deny that their "sovereignty," especially that of the big powers, is rigorously observed.

Finally, it is not a plan for collective security. This statement may come as a surprise, but we are here concerned with the actual Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, not with the distorted shadow of them that has been cast on the wall by the State Department's publicity campaign.

Then what, after all, are the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals? They are a carefully, though not very bravely, conceived plan to avoid or at least postpone, the next war.

The chief difficulty confronting those who seek to prevent war is that war's causes have never been scientifically explored. Religion has isolated them, but not science, and we are still in a scientific age. This is not the place to explore that question. But for perspective's sake, we may quote what two great scientists, one in the field of politics and one in the field of psychology, have had to say about war.

Thomas Hobbes wrote that "warre . . . is necessarily consequent to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants."

Sigmund Freud wrote, "There is but one way of ending war and that is by common consent of a central control which shall have the last word in every conflict of interest. For this, two things are needed, first, the creation of . . . a supreme court of judicature and, second, its investment with adequate executive force."

In other words, we shall not be rid of war until we have a world community with a world government, and perhaps not even then. The authors of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals probably knew this, but they also had another stubborn fact to

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if pooled through the League, would be sufficient, Wilson believed, to offset the aggression of any one big power. He believed it was to the interest of all states to accept common obligations to this effect. He assumed that the same moral standards governed the larger part of the world, that democracy would soon be universal, and that competitive enterprise and ultimate free trade would improve the living standards of all peoples. Had the U.S. Senate given this idea a chance, men might have succeeded in creating the world of Wilson's vision. It did not, and its failure has given the American people, or many of them, a sensitive conscience about all forms of world organization, so that today they are predisposed to join almost any.

But while men may learn from their mistakes, they may not repair them. Wilson's flat Mercator world is no longer even a possibility. It has become a shrunken globe spiked by two antipodal jagged peaks, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and by a third somewhat lower mountain, the British Empire. The rest of the world consists of foothills, active and inactive volcanoes, oceans, deserts, valleys, and swamps. As the world grows smaller, the differences in its moral and political climate become more obvious. It is one world, yes, but not in Wilson's sense. In morals, politics, and economics there are six or a dozen worlds, some dying, some merging, some waiting to be born.

At this moment the most powerful world is the U.S. Americans are slowly beginning to understand the vast extent of their boundless strength. We shall emerge from the war with the mightiest navy and air force in the world or in the history of the world, and with an army comparable only to that of Russia. Other nations, Britain and Russia especially, have made far greater per capita sacrifices than the American people in this war. But without American production, which fed Britain and put the Russian Army on wheels, the Nazi menace could not have been subdued. We have paid less for victory than any nation, and emerged with more power.

Mr. Churchill seems even more aware of America's power than we are ourselves. In his speech of January 8th he said: "We must marvel at the triumphant strength of the U.S. now roused from its peaceful, free and easy life against its desires, to become the greatest military force in the world."

Despite our tremendous military and economic power, the U.S. today is exercising less political influence on the future than its allies. This is partly because of our uncertainty as to how we wish to use our power. The [illegible] of American arms increases our national pride and our new sense of independence. In this kind of turbulent world do we really wish to accept external commitments restraining the use of our power? Or to submit our policies to international judgment? Just the other day Admiral King, echoing the late Secretary Knox, proclaimed the Navy's desire to keep the island bases we occupied in the Pacific. Some of these islands were Japanese mandates, but some—and the Admiral did not distinguish—are British, French, and Dutch. Such statements, suggesting a new American imperialism, arouse disquiet among our allies.

As to Soviet Russia, the other great center of military power, it has made more obvious gestures toward imperialism. Subtly but firmly extending its political influence over Poland, Finland, the Balkans, and northern China, and threatening to do the same in central Europe, Russia is creating a buffer zone of "friendly" governments all around its borders, whether the inhabitants want to be friendly or not. Meanwhile Russia takes an old-fashioned view of the international peace-keeping Organization. It will sign the fine words, but it will have its buffer states and alliances too. To the Russians, Dumbarton Oaks is probably just a tricky and tedious periphrasis for a mobile desirable objectives: a military alliance with the U.S. [illegible] has one with Britain.)

Britain, the third member of the triumvirate, occupies a more difficult position than either Russia or the U.S. It was [illegible] in World War III Britain would be immediately engaged in a murderous attack from what General Marshall calls "[illegible]." But its more immediate problem is how to feed the people of Britain, among the most heavily populated islands in the world, when this war is over. Despite recent achievements in the present war, Britain's historic position will inevitably give way somewhat to the U.S. and Russia in the future. Britain's foreign investments have been largely consumed, [illegible] much of its merchant marine has been sunk, its industries are in some respects inefficient. Nevertheless Britain possesses [illegible] time when the U.S. threatens to take over [illegible] the trade of the world Britain has numerous [illegible] solidarity, a superior political structure, more [illegible] good many raw materials, a good [illegible] and numerous strategic bases. But Britain, [illegible] the problem of postwar survival in a world dominated by [illegible] new giants involves new and difficult problems. While Britain might prefer to solve its economic and security problems through a universal organization, it cannot wait for the U.S. to make up its mind as to concrete policies. Wise statesmanship, at best, it therefore strives to create a sterling [illegible] which it will control through bilateral and other [illegible] also aims to restore its empire in the Orient, [illegible] dominant position in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa. Britain is committed to the idea of [illegible] organization, but it also looks to alternative [illegible].

Such, in broad strokes, is the [illegible] Three power centers. It is essential [illegible] Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, for the [illegible] accepted this background as their [illegible] assumption as to the [illegible] They accepted the existing [illegible] and their sought in their [illegible]

Three merits

The plan has three [illegible] great powers, and particularly [illegible] safeguarding any important [illegible] such security as it may create.

The U.S. and in this Organ [illegible] decisions. Once [illegible], the [illegible] it, as it is now. Instead of being asked [illegible] commitments we are offered a flexible framework within which we can seek our own policy. The same goes for Russia and Britain, for China and France. Possibly this is a concession [illegible] in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals; [illegible] postwar politics is confused and murky, and it may be a good time to retain some freedom of choice.

A second merit of Dumbarton Oaks is that it sets up machinery of continuous international consultation. Almost any diplomatic machinery, if its limitations are understood, is better than none at all. This particular machinery will not work unless the Big Five agree; but it provides them with a [illegible] forum, the Security Council, where they must seek their indispensable agreement regularly and before [illegible].

The third merit is that the Assembly and [illegible] the court are provided with great opportunities [illegible]

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power. Some of the best apologists of Dumbarton Oaks, such as Walter Lippmann, promise us that the Assembly and its organs, the Economic and Social Council, will replace the Security Council in importance, once the postwar "era of pacification" is past. In other words, an effective international democracy of equal states may grow out of Dumbarton Oaks, provided the forty-six members show the capacity for it. Nothing forbids them and much invites them. They will control the various "functional organizations" (I.L.O., F.A.O., International Monetary Fund and Bank, etc.) that can heal the wounds of this war and attack the social maladjustments that may cause the next. Through the cumulative force of wise recommendations and the backing of public opinion, they may gradually influence national policies and, over a long period, lay the groundwork for a genuine world community.

The flaws

But our generation is understandably most concerned with the next decade or two. Mr. Lippmann's "era of pacification." Will the Security Council bring us safely through it? To answer that we must turn to the flaws in Dumbarton Oaks. They may be summarized as follows: the plan's reliance on big power agreement is so desperate that no peaceful alternative is envisioned.

The rule of unanimity, also known as the big-power veto, makes it impossible for the Security Council to act against any threat of war if any one of the Big Five does not want to act. For example, suppose that the U.S. decides to invade Mexico as it did in 1916. We are pledged on joining the Organization not to use force "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization." But we might tell ourselves that this invasion is self-defense, so the pledge does not apply. According to the British official Commentary, the Organization will determine when "the right of self-defense has been properly used." Under the current Proposals, however, the U.S. could by simple veto, prevent the Council from deciding that our invasion was "a threat or breach of the peace," let alone take any action on Mexico's behalf.

The rule of unanimity goes further. The Council could of course take cognizance of the U.S.–Mexican controversy and even decide to urge that we take it to the world court. Under the Yalta formula, the U.S. as a party to the dispute could not vote on this decision. But a simple majority of the Council could still not make the decision. Each of the other four permanent members must agree. Considering how solid the Big Five must be for Dumbarton Oaks to work at all, it seems probable that at least one of our big allies would, if the U.S. wished it, veto the decision.

The unanimity rule may also protect an aggressor among the small states, if it has a friend on the Council. If Bulgaria and Greece became embroiled over Macedonia, either Russia or Britain could by simple veto prevent the Council from even investigating the dispute.

As we have seen, this flexibility is a merit but it is a danger too. The danger is that a series of threats to the peace, not even open wars, may develop while the veto-bound Security Council takes no action. Its elaborate military paraphernalia may remain idle throughout a major crisis. Nobody is committed in advance to any positive action, except as the Council may order. This is the first weakness of the Dumbarton Oaks plan: it fails to provide collective security while professing to do so.

The standard defense of this weakness in Dumbarton Oaks is that of the *New York Times* in a recent editorial: "The whole hope of maintaining peace rests on the best methods and the good faith of the three Great Powers." That is a very moderate view of history. Of course if the great powers wish to make there will be no major war. But if good faith is enough to maintain peace, why do we need a Security Council?

It is true that any attempt to coerce a major power probably mean a major war. Yet there remains the question whether action against the next aggressor should not be taken with the same hesitation and uncertainty that marked the entrance of many of the United Nations into the present war against Germany. The U.S., for example, stayed out of World War II for about two years. Under a real system of collective security, the U.S. and all the other United Nations would have entered the war immediately following the German attack on Poland. The knowledge that the U.S. was under a commitment to do so would have created a deterrent to Nazi aggression far greater than any that has been exercised. But no such deterrent does not exist under Dumbarton Oaks because of the big-power veto.

Under Secretary Grew and others defend their handiwork by arguing further that it would be better not to have the Security Council and Assembly than to have an international body which might not succeed. World opinion, they argue, will not tolerate aggression. World opinion will be a substitute for effective action. But the so-called "moral sanctions" will have a very limited influence in a world in which many nations do not enjoy freedom of the press, radio and speech, and may even be kept in ignorance of events taking place from without.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals [illegible] system of collective security, but they [illegible] the principle of equality of nations. They [illegible] the "sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." But in fact they accord, establish the principle of [illegible] states control the policy of [illegible] Council and other peoples [illegible] states under this form of [illegible] aggression would be left by the Security Council [illegible] power to [illegible] discretion [illegible] acting at the [illegible] Proposals accept amendments [illegible] contrast to the Big Five rule which [illegible]

Yet there is [illegible] that the new world Organization [illegible] Further. Yet [illegible] invoking it on the Proposals. The [illegible] because they [illegible] the foreign [illegible] Britain [illegible] Russia [illegible] matters and Russia [illegible] In these ways [illegible] opposite [illegible] parochial inequality [illegible] great power to dominate its smaller neighbors. Does this encourage this domination, or the secret [illegible]

as both will well know [illegible] can prevent. The Big Three must [illegible] to be kept. But the absolute [illegible] is a standing invitation to [illegible] reminded. However shocked the other [illegible] will look the other way a long time before [illegible] big-power unity, that one indispensable [illegible]

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Commonweal says with reference to Yalta (March 2):

"What disturbs us the most about the entire policy line of the Big Three is their seeming tendency toward assumption of world hegemony. If this is in fact the intention, then we shall be confronted with a world in which small states will be in substance feudal appanages of the most powerful country in their neighborhood. For the nations of the world of their own free will to curtail their sovereignty is one thing—and a desirable thing. For the big powers to retain their full sovereignty and force their lesser neighbors to give up theirs is dangerous and bad."

Imperialism vs. federalism

The clustering of satellites around the three great power centers, which Dumbarton Oaks will indirectly promote, is sometimes justified as inevitable, on the ground that the day of the independent small state is over. Some people argue that because of technological reasons small states must inevitably be absorbed by big ones. But this sphere-of-influence solution involves two grave dangers. First, any system under which a big power can regiment its smaller neighbor involves great injustices. Here it is necessary to talk with some frankness. Soviet Russia is a totalitarian regime. Should it absorb or control its neighbors, totalitarianism would be extended into countries some of which at least have upheld the concept of Western individualism. Today there are disquieting reports that in Poland, Soviet-controlled authorities are carrying out wholesale deportations and even executions of Poles loyal to the London government. These reports may be exaggerated or untrue. But neither the American nor the English people devoted to the tradition of freedom, will long support any system that makes the big powers immune from international responsibilities for essentially barbarous acts.

The second danger is that the spheres of influence inevitably tend to clash. If our hands-off policy in Eastern Europe results in the destruction of Poland for the sake of Big Power unity, will it also acquiesce in the partition of China on the same basis? If so, how should China be divided? Will Russia and the U.S. divide Germany in a Europe divided into Russian and U.S. spheres? Who is to have the Middle East? Without some principle of justice, this kind of peace can lead only to the rivalries of the Big Three.

It does not follow that we can or should restore the old system as it existed in 1938. But the consolidation of a group of states is not an end in itself. It should be done only for the purpose of advancing both welfare and freedom. Instead of encouraging such voluntary mergers in the past, the Big Three have actually opposed them. Hitler vetoed an agreement in 1932 providing for a 10 per cent tariff reduction between Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. Soviet Russia has opposed the idea of a Scandinavian federation and frowned on similar projects for both central and western Europe. Washington has discouraged the concept of a united Europe because of the belief, in our view mistaken, that a united Europe would be dominated by German imperialism. A Paris newspaper, *Temps Present*, recently wrote, "There are two ways of realizing this organization of the world: by the imperialism of a few great powers dividing the vassal world among themselves, or by a federalism freely born and internationally guided from the will of the peoples. It is unfortunate that the first solution should have been chosen at Yalta . . ."

Yet all these defects and dangers in the *Dumbarton Oaks* Proposals might be readily overlooked if it were not for one final defect, the most significant of all. We must accept that the Proposals are "realistic" in that they fit the present state of world politics. We may agree that our best hope of peace does indeed lie in the continued collaboration of the Big Three, even in their "good faith." But the old question remains: *Quis custodiet custodes?* Who polices the policemen? What is disturbing about the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals is not that they do not answer this question satisfactorily, but that they do not even try to answer it at all.

The Big Three do not profess or bind themselves to any known standard of international morality. They do not even appeal to the *concept* of justice, or of law, or of freedom. They acknowledge no higher moral authority than their own sweet will. The defect may seem trivial, remediable with a few strong words. But if some higher standard than "security" was not in the authors' minds to begin with, it may be doubted whether they will achieve even that.

Yes or no?

Such are our misgivings about Dumbarton Oaks. They are profound misgivings. Is it not our duty, then, as journalists to urge all American citizens and Congressmen to oppose the plan? Would it not be wiser of the State Department, admitting failure, throw this blueprint away, and start all over again, rather than, to keep the U.S. from joining in the wrong organization at all?

Better roads to peace might have been explored than the one which the peoples of the world are now asked to travel. But in the course of popular discussion of the Proposals, the merits of other schemes and policies have been necessarily weighed and found wise and foolish. They range all the way from an Anglo-American alliance to a real United Nations Charter, and include a variety of concepts such as "Western Union," "Atlantic Community" and the "Atlantic Charter."

If we actually could "start over" the whole reconsideration of plans and policies might be very useful. But as there is never a wholly "new chapter" in history, as the Yalta conference is the result of the lessons and the perplexities of the last few years, as the peoples of the world have before them, and now in force, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, for us to reject them to any degree or in any "parts" which it is necessary to work through would be a very difficult task. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are based on the main outlines of our wartime coalition, thus keeping a foothold in reality. It is a plausible, even a hopeful road to peace, however rocky. Those whose hearts are set on peace at all costs may be wise to accept it. They will be still wiser if they bear always in mind that winning the Organization is only a fraction of the task of preventing the next war. The rest of the job for us Americans, and much the biggest part of our job, lies in the sustained development of our own domestic and foreign policies. Any one of these may be either powerful or impotent if the rest of the world is racked by poverty and lawless conflict. But in the world's greatest continental economy the real being of peace is strong, vigorous, outward looking and morally sure of itself.

Finally, even to eternally basic principles of freedom, we shall not keep our political institutions simply by keeping them to themselves. The world changes and it will, as does Dumbarton Oaks, as does the U.S. But all three can be improved, and the U.S. can do more to improve them as a member of the Organization than without.

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V HOW TO MAKE THE FINAL CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS

The time to begin making "improvements" is right now at San Francisco. If at San Francisco improvements are made over the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, that will be evidence that progress toward a just and durable peace *can* be made under Big Three domination. If, on the contrary, no improvements are made at San Francisco, many groups and individuals who have tentatively endorsed the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals may properly feel compelled to withhold their support from the actual Charter of the Organization.

There is plenty of room for improvement now. Many sensible and morally responsible suggestions have been made officially, semi-officially, and by private persons. We outline here, with brief comment, the more important improvements on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that we believe to be both practical and necessary.

1) Greater recognition of the rule of law

The Charter of the Organization should contain recognition of the principles of justice and law. Such recognition is now almost entirely absent. In this respect the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are much weaker than the Preamble of the League Covenant, which called for "the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments" and for "the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another."

We specifically endorse Senator Vandenberg's proposal that the Charter should have as one of its leading purposes "to establish justice and to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms."

Second, the Charter of the Organization should instruct the General Assembly to appoint a commission on law on the codification of international law and on the basis of such studies, to submit, say within five years, conventions embodying recognized principles or proposing new ones. In 1942 the American nations created an Inter-American Juridical Committee, which, sitting at Rio de Janeiro, did excellent work, the fruits of which were seen at the Mexico City conference this spring. This precedent should be followed at San Francisco.

Third, the San Francisco Conference should accept the Permanent Court of International Justice as the principal judicial organ of the Organization—instead of creating a new one. To achieve this result it will be necessary to amend the Court statutes so as to transfer the powers of the old League Assembly and Council with respect to the election of judges and other matters to corresponding bodies in the Organization. At the same time change might be made in the statute to make it easier of amendment and to give the Permanent Court power to create regional chambers. The so-called optional clause under which some forty-five states accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court in so-called legal disputes should certainly be retained and if possible strengthened.

The Charter should also contain a clause similar to Article 18 of the League Covenant—providing for the registration with the Secretariat of all international treaties or engagements.

Finally, in order to give immediate significance to the recognition of the rule of law, and pending the recommendations of the General Assembly's commission on law, it is recommended that a definition of "aggression" be incorporated into the Charter of the Organization. A good example is the Act of Chapultepec adopted by the American nations on March 8, 1945, which said among other things that "invasion by armed forces of one state of the territory of another, trespassing boundaries established by [illegible] or demarcation [illegible] shall constitute acts of aggression." Attempts [illegible] definition for the Dechnation of Aggression proposed by Russia and its seven neighbors at the [illegible] Russia was the author

2) Greater recognition of the need for peaceful change

One of the most [illegible] proposals is that they give to the Assembly [illegible] powers to recommend peaceful changes. It can make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare." It should be made clear that action of the Assembly under this power may not be vitiated by veto power vote in the Security Council. Second, it should be made clear that the Assembly is not debarred from making recommendations as to the revision of peace treaties by Chapter XII, 2 of Dumbarton Oaks, which asserts, "No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorized in relation to enemy states as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." Governments should have the unrestricted right to [illegible] new provision in [illegible] settlement [illegible] decide to be unjust

3) Strengthen the General Assembly

The powers of the Assembly should be increased along the following lines

a) The Assembly should have the right to make recommendations on any matter relating to peace and security if the Security Council has not acted on the question, say within three months.

b) The Assembly should have the right to admit new members into the Organization by a two-thirds vote of its members together with a two-thirds vote of the Security Council including three of the five permanent members.

c) The Assembly should have the power to propose amendments to the Charter by a two-thirds vote, effective when ratified by a majority of the members including three of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Any member unwilling to be bound by a new amendment should be given the right to resign upon two years' notice.

d) The Assembly should have broader powers of control and coordination over so-called functional organizations, such as the proposed food organization and the International Labor Organization. The Assembly should be given the power to vote a consolidated annual budget for all such specialized organizations. The Assembly would not have the authority either to expand or restrict functions granted such organizations by separate conventions. But through this budgetary control it could watch

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over administration, prevent chaotic proliferation of the staffs of such organizations, and secure uniformity in policy.

e) Finally, under this head, the San Francisco Conference should give serious consideration to the principle of "weighted representation" of nations in the Assembly. The Assembly would achieve greater effectiveness and influence if the great powers were more adequately represented there.

Weighted representation means that each state should be given a number of votes according to a rough formula based on such factors as population, literacy, and national income. The difficulties involved in working out an acceptable formula are obvious. Nevertheless, as a basis for discussion we propose for a ten-year period that each of the five big powers be given twenty votes; that each of the so-called middle powers, such as Canada, Brazil, India, and the Netherlands, be given ten; and that each of the twenty-two states having less than five million people be given one seat. Under such a system, Soviet Russia could allot its twenty seats among its constituent republics. The small states, even with weighted voting, would still have the same opportunity to express their views as they have under equal voting strength. Moreover, since the Assembly is not a legislative body, no state would legally be bound by its deliberations. Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Assembly would be treated more seriously as a constitution of that body more nearly reflected the distribution of population and productivity of the world, and the adoption of the principle of weighted representation could pave the way for the development of a real world community outlook.

4) *The role of the Security Council should be modified*

A strong case could be made for abolishing altogether the enforcement powers of the Security Council. As now planned, the Council will enforce its decisions only when all the big powers agree to gang up on one or two little powers. This could make the enforcement power of the Council a joke and a bitter one. The punitive power of the Security Council dependent on the big-power veto has already led to wide-spread mistrust. Doing away with the punitive power of the Council would reduce this distrust, for the inferior legal status imposed on small powers would be removed. And the Organization would still retain its chief merit and virtue namely, that of providing a regular system for getting together and talking things over. This suggestion, in short, is that the Security Council should be a solemn consultative body rather than an executive agency. Sanctions against aggression would still be possible but would be left to the discretion of states, acting wherever possible in accordance with concrete security agreements.

This is a logical suggestion. Nevertheless it seems unwise to urge that the punitive powers of the Security Council be scrapped now. Defective as the Proposals are, they represent an attempt to institutionalize the use of force. In any case, the Charter should broaden the obligation of the Security Council to investigate all disputes that threaten world peace, and make recommendations, as follows:

First, the right of any one of the Big Five (if not a party) to prevent the Security Council from even investigating a controversy should be abolished. It is recommended that the Council be authorized to investigate a controversy and recommend a settlement by a vote of seven of the eleven members, including any three of the Big Five.

Second, the Council should be clearly granted the power to *recommend terms* **of settlement, in addition to "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" as in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.**

Third, the present right of any state to block investigation of any dispute by the Council on the ground that it is a "domestic" question should be drastically qualified. It is recommended that the reservation as to "domestic" problems be eliminated. If this is impossible, then the Charter should make it clear that the determination of what constitutes a "domestic" question should be decided not by the party itself but by the World Court.

5) *Encouragement to regional arrangements*

Although the [illegible] leading powers in Europe, Soviet Russia, France, and Great Britain have attempted to secure their future security by special alliances. But alliances breed counter-alliances. Their use in the past tends to strengthen competitive spheres of influence. The pressures made in all these cases tend to lose their validity as the underlying conditions have changed so that the promises are not kept. We witness the curious spectacle of the Soviet-Czech alliance at the time of Munich. We would like to see a different approach to the security problem in Europe through the creation of a series of pooled-power [illegible] of the world: joint forces and United Nations [illegible] units of the Big Three and other powers [illegible] which would act as a stabilizing [illegible] would be an Anglo-American air force [illegible] other cities [illegible] and British and American bases [illegible] twenty years after the war.

[illegible] Dumbarton Oaks Proposals [illegible] without the authorization of the Security Council [illegible] but only against the aggressor. [illegible] security system [illegible] Russia, [illegible] other [illegible] such a veto [illegible] a two-thirds majority [illegible] veto [illegible] would not be [illegible] every [illegible] agreement, [illegible] should be [illegible] Security Council and its Military Staff Committee [illegible] powers. Disputes [illegible] should immediately [illegible] action taken [illegible] recommendations [illegible] Security Council. The United Nations [illegible] and the General Assembly should have the right to express an opinion and make recommendations as to whether such special action is in accord with international law and world security.

6) *A declaration of principles with regard to colonial and non-self-governing peoples*

The Charter of the Organization should contain a declaration of principles with regard to colonial and non-self-governing peoples. This declaration would presumably do no more than recognize that (1) the government of dependent peoples is a "sacred trust"; (2) the goal of colonial rule is the progressive development of self-government; (3) colonial powers, holding these sacred trusts and having accepted the progressive goal, are in some degree accountable to an appropriate international

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over administration, prevent chaotic proliferation of the activity of such organizations, and secure coordination among them.

e) Finally, under this head the sponsors of the Charter should give serious consideration to the principle of "weighted representation" of nations in the Assembly. The Assembly could achieve greater effectiveness and influence if the world's peoples were more adequately represented there.

Weighted representation means that each state should be given a number of votes according to a carefully worked out formula based on such factors as population, literacy and national income. The difficulties involved in working out an acceptable formula are obvious. Nevertheless as a basis for discussion we propose for a ten-year period that each of the five big powers be given twenty votes, that each of the so-called middle powers such as Canada, Brazil, India and the Netherlands be given ten votes, and that each of the twenty-two states having less than one million people be given one vote. Under such a system the Soviet Russian could allot its twenty votes among its sixteen Soviet republics. The small states, even with weighted votes, would still have the same opportunity to express their views as they have under equal voting strength. Moreover, since the Assembly is not a legislative body, no state would legally be bound by its deliberations. Nevertheless the recommendations of the Assembly would be treated more seriously if the constitution of that body more nearly reflected the distribution of population and productivity of the world, and the adoption of the principle of weighted representation could pave the way for the development of a real world community outlook.

4) The role of the Security Council should be modified

A strong case could be made for abolishing altogether the enforcement powers of the Security Council. As now planned the Council will enforce its decisions only when all the big powers agree to gang up on one or two little powers. This could make the enforcement power of the Council a poke, and a bitter one. The punitive power of the Security Council dependent on the big-power veto has already led to widespread mistrust. Doing away with the punitive power of the Council would reduce this distrust, for the inferiority complex of states very sensitive on small powers would be removed. And the Organization would still retain its chief merit and virtue, so far as that is applicable, a regular system for getting people talking, that is to say. This suggestion, in short, is that the Security Council should be a solemn consultative body rather than an executive body. Sanctions against aggression would still be possible but would be left to the discretion of states, acting wherever possible in accordance with concrete security agreements.

This is a logical suggestion. Nevertheless it seems unwise to urge that the punitive powers of the Security Council be scrapped now. Defective as the Proposals are, they represent an attempt to institutionalize the use of force. In any case, the Charter should broaden the obligation of the Security Council to investigate all disputes that threaten world peace, and make recommendations, as follows:

First, the right of any one of the Big Five (if not a party) to prevent the Security Council from even investigating a controversy should be abolished. It is recommended that the Council be authorized to investigate a controversy and recommend a settlement by a vote of seven of the eleven members, including any three of the Big Five.

Second, the Council should be clearly granted the power to recommend terms of settlement in addition to appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment [illegible]

[illegible] right of any party to these investigations of [illegible] Council on the ground that [illegible] powers should be [illegible] published. It is recommended that the Council on "domestic" problems or disputes. If this suggestion [illegible] Charter should make it clear that the determination of what constitutes a "domestic" question should be decided upon by the party itself or by the World Court.

5) Encouragement to regional arrangements

[illegible] powers in Europe, Soviet Russia, [illegible] to form large armed forces to protect their [illegible] alliances. But alliances breed counter-[illegible] Today's cold war tends to [illegible] competitive [illegible] armaments made in advance soon tend to [illegible] Our naval [illegible] changes so [illegible] with [illegible] the Franco-[illegible] alliance at the time of Munich. We would like to see a different approach to the security problem through the creation of a series of pooled powers [illegible] parts of the world, joint Soviet and United Nations [illegible] consisting of units of the Big Three and other powers [illegible] circumstances at which we did not [illegible] stabilizing [illegible] in this direction would be for the American [illegible] to withdraw by other states [illegible] the Continental Militia [illegible] and naval bases [illegible] the world, for [illegible] after the war.

[illegible] Dumbarton Oaks Proposals [illegible] agreements [illegible] without the authorization of the Security Council. This means that one big power could be an aggressor, or [illegible] the operation of the security system [illegible] in the Atlantic Charter principles, [illegible] Russia or Britain, or any other such arrangement. To impose such a veto at the cost of a [illegible] would [illegible] more harm than good and the veto [illegible] would not be enforced. In our opinion, every [illegible] security agreement, regional or otherwise, should be submitted to the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee for "observations." Likewise, parties should immediately report action taken under such agreements to the Security Council. The latter body and the General Assembly should have the right to express an opinion and make recommendations as to whether such regional actions are in accord with international law and world security.

6) A declaration of principles with regard to colonial and non-self-governing peoples

The Charter of the Organization should contain a declaration of principles with regard to colonial and non-self-governing peoples. This declaration would presumably do no more than recognize that: (1) the government of dependent peoples is a "sacred trust"; (2) the goal of colonial rule is the progressive development of self-government; (3) colonial powers, holding these sacred trusts and having accepted the progressive goal, are in some degree accountable to an appropriate international

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authority for the discharge of their trust and their progress toward the goal.

The question of how such a declaration of principles should be implemented and enforced is too large to be discussed in any detail at San Francisco. We suggest that the conference instruct the General Assembly to call a United Nations conference to deal exclusively with the problems of [illegible] and other so-called backward areas. This conference should decide whether or not the Mandates Commission should be continued in its present form or changed, whether a world colonial commission should be established or whether greater progress can be made by regional method.

7) International bill of rights

How a government treats its own nationals within its borders has usually been regarded as nobody's business but its own. International law considers it a "domestic question." After the so-called Minorities Treaties were drawn up [illegible] states of Europe after World War I [illegible] international obligations to treat its own nationals [illegible] even as human beings.

The terrible atrocities of the past few years, unequaled in anything since the Dark Ages, illustrate [illegible] the human spirit when it refuses to [illegible] "Am I my brother's keeper?" What has happened in many parts of the world is [illegible] savagery, "made more sinister," as Mr. [illegible] phrase, "by the lights of perverted science." [illegible] zation is to survive, based on the rights [illegible] ness of the individual, an international [illegible] concerned with man's treatment of man [illegible]

From this premise many groups and [illegible] international bill of rights. The recent [illegible] ence at Mexico City declared in favor [illegible] protection of the rights of man," and [illegible] American Judicial Committee to draft such [illegible]

[illegible] Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man [illegible] Government rights and freedoms [illegible] Department took at the Bogotá [illegible] views at the Rio Pact [illegible] therefore suggest that a [illegible] Bill of Rights be [illegible] [illegible] and [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

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20 January 1943

201-Bunford, Kenneth (.nl)

SUBJECT: Parents' Request for Return of .l. to U.S.

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, WD.

1. Attached hereto is a letter received from Mr. J. Bunford, containing a request that his son who was inducted in England be returned to the United States for training. The letter was addressed apparently in error to the Director, Major General William J. Donovan, rather than to Brigadier General Leo Donovan of the Army Ground Forces.

2. This office has informed Mr. Bunford that the Army Ground Forces have sole jurisdiction over such matters and that his letter was being forwarded to you. A copy of our letter is inclosed for your information.

[redacted]
Acting Director

2 Incls.
Incl 1. Ltr fr Mr. Bunford
Incl 2. Cy OSS Reply

PFP:etr

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20 January 1943

Mr. J. Bunford
83 Garner Avenue
Buffalo, New York

Dear Mr. Bunford:

I have your letter addressed to General Donovan, Director of this Agency, in which you requested that your son, Pvt. Kenneth Bunford, be returned to the United States for training.

Since he is not assigned to this Agency, we have no authority to determine the locality of his training. In view of the fact he is assigned to the Army Ground Forces, it is our belief that you intended that your request should be to Brigadier General Lee Donovan, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Army Ground Forces. I am, therefore, forwarding it to him for consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director

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[illegible] 1945

Mr. Alfred M. Breor
[illegible]. Ft-214
Javen Point-Claremont Terminal
Ft. of Ogden Avenue
Jersey City 5, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Breor:

[illegible] General Donovan is not in the country [illegible] and accordingly [illegible] to review your letter of 21 December 1944, relating [illegible].

[illegible] much interested in seeing your letter upon his return, [illegible] cannot predict [illegible] will be. Since the time of his return is so indefinite, [illegible] information about a job by our personnel procurement [illegible] position in OSS for a man with Major Bull's qualifications. [illegible] General Donovan upon his return for [illegible] as to [illegible] take.

Sincerely,

Charles M. Lunn
Lt., USNR
Chief, Secretariat

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After [illegible] return to

BAYONNE, N. J.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES CONFIDENTIAL

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO General Donovan DATE 20 November 1944

FROM William L. Langer

SUBJECT

I notice from a letter from London, dated 6 November 1944, that the R&A staff in London has taken on a Captain Burnham, who is the former editor of the Commonweal. Captain Burnham's functions are described as the study of the Catholic church in present day Germany and the development of Catholic contacts that might be of interest to military government.

In view of your interest in this aspect of the problem and in view of Captain Burnham's obvious qualifications for this work, I thought I ought to call this matter to your attention in case you would like to make further use of Captain Burnham.

William L. Langer
Chief, Research and
Analysis Branch

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To Mr. Chester

CONFIDENTIAL

14 November 1944

TO: ~~The Secretariat~~

FROM: European Theater Office

SUBJECT: Circumstances Concerning Transfer of Mr. Buhler from SO to SI

The Director has requested further information concerning the circumstances under which Mr. Buhler was transferred from SO to SI. The European Theater report for September (SO section) protests this action on the part of the Branches concerned in Washington.

Buhler was on the German Desk in SO. Because of lack of publicable matter etc. recruiting of agent personnel for SO German operations was at a standstill. Policy and other problems which the Theater called upon SO, Washington, to work out were handled by officers above Buhler. As a result, he had no work to do here. SI badly needed someone with Buhler's qualifications and Colonel Hoffman was asked to approve Buhler's transfer. This Colonel Hoffman did. Colonel Hoffman did not advise the field of the transfer until after it was effected. The SO organization in ETO did not understand that the requests they put to Washington for action on Central European problems were being handled by others than Buhler. If they had fully understood this, I do not believe they would have protested the transfer so vigorously. On the other hand, they themselves might have wished to utilize Buhler's services in ETO. For this reason, it would have been preferable for Colonel Hoffman to have cleared the matter with the field before effecting the transfer.

Transfers in Washington of military personnel who are assigned to a Theater are always cleared with the Theater prior to the transfer. As civilian personnel are not carried on Theater allotments, clearance of transfers is not made with any Theater. Such transfers are effected within the discretion of the Branch Chief, who is presumed to have overall knowledge of the needs of his Branch.

John D. Wilson

John D. Wilson
European Theater Officer

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SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE

FROM

SUBJECT

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Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: Lt. J. W. Anderson

FROM: John E. O'Hara

SUBJECT: Cecilio E. Durkin

[redacted] paragraph, [redacted] inspection.

"The ship I was on was [redacted] of convalescent soldiers, [redacted] and Army personnel, [redacted] all equipped or prepared [redacted] 14 plus two nasty [redacted] wives, [redacted] had originally [redacted] crowded into [redacted] foul and unbearable [redacted] biological [redacted] sleepless night I [redacted] the vacant [redacted] move the [redacted] nurses returning [redacted] by telling the mothers that they [redacted] from the vacant cabin, and if any of the other [redacted] One who was too sick to leave her berth took advantage of the Captain's offer and moved into the clean cabin leaving behind the foul dirty they had created. An orderly was supposed to clean the cabin but did not appear, and a seaman, charged with transferring the baggage from one cabin to the other, volunteered to clean up. I did not think it fair for this lad to assume all the work and proceeded to sweep and mop the cabin deck aided by the seaman and one of the nurses. Then after thoroughly spraying the cabin with insecticide I was able to relax and breathe more easily. In passing, I should like to state that I have never seen a dirtier ship; in fact it is the first dirty vessel I have ever seen. Why such a condition should exist is unknown to me as there was no lack of personnel aboard."

John E. O'Hara. Lt

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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In reply refer to file/ltr and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

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P. O. Box 2601
Washington 13, D.C.
10 October 1944

Major Isadore Hurstein, O-1167347
Det. 404, Hq. SEAC
APO 432
c/o [illegible] New York, N.Y.

Dear Major Hurstein:

Since Colonel Robinson is away, I am taking the liberty of answering your letter to him which we received on 3 October. We are all glad to know that you got to your destination safely, although it really did take you a very long time to get there.

We realize that you have gone out to a theater where training is one of the most difficult and at the same time one of the most challenging problems. The supply situation is a difficult one; you are operating thousands of miles away from your base and there is bound to be delay between the transmission of men and supplies. Under those circumstances, which we readily recognize, a man must preserve his sense of proportions and take the good and the bad in his stride. You must remember above all that your loyalty to your commanding officer, and through him to the organization which you represent in that theater, is of paramount importance and must not be sidetracked by any feeling of loyalty toward anyone not physically present in the theater. We recognize that there are many problems other than supplies and men, but you will have to meet these problems in such a manner that it does not interfere in any way with the job which you have at hand.

This situation calls for extreme tact, indefatigable attention to details and orders, and a consuming desire to do the job at hand. You were sent out there by Colonel Robinson to do that job and we hope that our confidence has not been misplaced. You have been in the Army long enough to know that, rightly or wrongly, the Army demands unfailing loyalty on the part of its soldiers for their superiors and an honest attempt to carry out their orders, even though circumstances may be such as to make this a difficult matter at times.

We are given to understand here that there are great things in store for the theater in which you are operating; furthermore, we realize that up to this time it has been a rather quiet spot. Men and materials are being sent out to implement a large program and I am certain that you will not lack for things to do. We are sending Major Callahan and twelve

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other officers and men as part of the training staff, and with them you should be able to get off to a good start.

Let me reiterate what I have said before: that we understand your problems but feel that in order to do the job which you were sent to do, you must muster up all the tact, all the loyalty and all the techniques that you can.

Please give my regards to Eric Lindgren and Taylor and accept my own personal regards for yourself.

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

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Sunday Evening Sept 10, 1944.

1944 OCT 3 14 01

Dear Colonel,

I arrived in Colombo with the rest of the men, via plane, just 2 days ago. We went direct to Kandy by train. Upon my arrival there at Kandy I was dismayed and perturbed to learn that Dr. Enders had been scheduled returned to the U.S. via boat.

It appeared from my reception that I had arrived under a cloud - I did not having anybody to turn to - I kept quiet and let my big ears flap in the breeze. It was a big chore - trying to receive information.

Colonel, may I impress upon you that within 2 days I have come upon another "Vesper". Major Vickers was pretty composed to what is going on out there. It stems up to how the Aspand I can't understand - not at the present time -

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it all he avoided departing.

I went in to see Col. Heppner - and he greeted me with these words - "You are to take over Tunis and try to repair the disastrous results which have occured since under Enders." Strange words to me indeed knowing what Enders was to do after - pale advice.

They put Dr. Enders here at first in order that he shouldn't meet up with Dr. McConaughey. Then he still chuckling out here over the fact that Dr. Mac didn't realize see the whole picture & that there whirlwind tour: kept him too busy to see too much.

All in all the situation out here stinks. What they need out here is a full colonel with some medical and not one who is medical so social activity. [illegible] that must at the top some how have formed themselves into a clique whose main activities are to send back to the States all those who wish to do their job, and to carry on their own

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social activities to the detriment of the organization and the job that needs to be done.

I might add that you can verify these conditions by speaking to the Dt. (RK Enders) and also contacting a Major Schultz who is in the same branch as Mr. Murdock. Major Schultz flew home and should be in Washington by now.

Again may I impress upon you that I will do my damndest to get this affair straightened out [illegible] all your help. I must not [illegible] down the drain — by [illegible] this — it is very easy for them to get rid of an officer — all they have to do is to send him to the replacement pool in the CBI and he is lost and Washington will not hear from him. Don't let that happen to me — as I am just about starting in on this fight.

I might add that they (meaning the top men) here are looking for some good finance men to straighten out their

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affairs out here.

This letter is very damning and of course very uncomplimentary but I wish you could come out here yourself and see it with your own eyes. I might add this other little remark that I have spoken to a few people out here whom I have had as students in the States and they all say that Dr. Enders was sent back because he wanted to get a job done & all, with the exception of the top men hold Enders in great esteem. Another thing, they are finding out some very erroneous and false reports to the States in order to cover up their own mistakes & ineptness. I am sure you will take immediate action on this matter and I do wish I had a second cable right now for nothing is known out here. Can you send me one?

Please give me your utmost co-operation and again don't tell me what to do. Then send me down the river.

My best regards to you and all the folks in the office.

Sincerely,

Jerry

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

21 October 1944

To Brigadier General William J Donovan

From John C Hughes

Subject 1st Lt Peter A Bucky, AUS

To Lt Peter A Bucky
He should find out from John Hughes

Several days ago, SI-Washington gave Lt Bucky permission to come to New York to talk to me and several of my Staff about the possibilities of his being assigned here for work on European matters, particularly those pertaining to Germany. I have had several talks with him and have also had him talk to Sherman and Mrs Rado. We have all come to the conclusion that at this stage of the game there is no real work for him to do here and we consider that it would be inadvisable to attempt to make a job for him at a time when we are beginning to cut down on the personnel, in our various New York offices, who have been handling matters pertaining to Europe. I have, therefore, explained the situation to Lt Bucky and have instructed him to report back to Lt Poole for further orders.

called Hughes about this 10/25 EAP

As you probably know, Lt Bucky was transferred from AMG in London to the OSS and was returned by OSS-London to the United States because of ill health. Unless SI in Washington has some specific job in mind for him, I strongly recommend that he be released and turned back to the Army. I believe that, on account of his personality and temperament, it would be unwise to arrange for his continued assignment to the OSS in this country and I do not believe we are under any obligation to do so. In any event, after full discussion with Mr Sherman and Mrs Rado, we are convinced that it would not serve any helpful purpose to have him assigned to OSS-New York and, as stated, I have explained carefully to him that there is no opening here because of our present emphasis on Far Eastern matters.

I am taking the liberty of writing you regarding this because I believe that he may attempt to see you in the next week or so, with further reference to possible work with the OSS. He seemed anxious to have an assignment in New York, chiefly so that he might have certain medical treatment, of his own choosing, here, but this seems to me to be something for the Army to decide and I do not believe that the OSS should become involved.

JCH

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

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WILLIAM SCHROEDER JR. M.E.
CALORIA
184 JOHNSON STREET
BROOKLYN, N.Y.

June 20, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

By way of introduction, I had the pleasure of knowing you rather intimately back in the days of the old 69th and 14th Regiments, N.Y.N.G. At that time, I was Lieut. Col. of the 14th.

Mr. Peter Bucky, the bearer of this letter, is an old friend of mine and is the son of Professor Bucky who has invented, together with many scientific improvements in Xray apparatus, a new camera known as the Coreco Automatic Color Camera which I understand is well thought of by both the United States Army and Navy.

Mr. Bucky will explain his desires to you, and anything you may be able to do will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

William Schroeder Jr.

WS.hr

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[illegible]

[illegible] request for transfer of Officer [illegible]

TO : The Adjutant General's Office, War Department
Washington, D. C. ATTENTION: Personnel Div.

1. It is requested that the orders [illegible] effective [illegible], be amended to direct the following named officers [illegible] present station and [illegible] to this Headquarters [illegible], D. C., directing, also, to be sent [illegible] Headquarters Detachment, 2025 E Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.

Name	Serial No.	Present Station	Remarks
Glenn [illegible] Hurlett	0-1554[illegible]	[illegible] Department	[illegible]

2. Commanding General, [illegible] Forces [illegible] is relieved of above subject matter.

3. The personnel is not required to [illegible] for overseas, not to [illegible] Replacement Training Center or [illegible] place [illegible].

4. [illegible] approved by [illegible] of transfer orders.

For the Director:

E. F. [illegible],
Colonel, FA,
Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch.

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[redacted]

28 Sep. '44

Mrs. O'Donnell

We have informed Major [illegible], of Schools and Training of this letter and have explained the circumstances to him.

C. Cutterson

Office of the Assistant [illegible]

[illegible]

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[redacted]

To: Lt. Putzell

Please note and return.

L. A. Fiedel

Director's Office

(3308)

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SAVE

BUY WAR BONDS

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES

SPECIAL SERVICES DIVISION
[redacted]
Washington, D. C.

In reply refer to SPSPB 230. (16 Sept 44)

16 September 1944.

Mr. Charles S. Chester,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chester:

On 11 September 1944 we requested the release of Mr. Asa S. Bushnell to assist as special advisor to Lt. Col. Henry A. Clark of the Athletic Branch.

Colonel Clark has been alerted for overseas duty, making the urgency of Mr. Bushnell's services in this task even greater.

We understand that he will be available as of Monday, 18 September 1944. We are making arrangements with him direct for salary and other conditions of employment.

We appreciate your cooperating with us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH A. BYRON,
Major General,
Director, Special Services Division.

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XC/et

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Washington, D. C.

SPSPB 230.
(16 Sept 44)

16 September 1944.

Mr. Charles M. Chester,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chester:

On 11 September 1944 we requested the release of [illegible] S. Bushnell to assist as special advisor to Lt. Col. Henry A. Clark of the Athletic Branch.

Colonel Clark has been alerted for overseas duty, making the urgency of Mr. Bushnell's services in this task even greater.

We understand that he will be available as of Monday, 18 September 1944. We are making arrangements with him direct for salary and other conditions of employment.

We appreciate your cooperating with us in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]
Major General,
Director, Special Services Division.

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[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
Schools and Training Branch
2324 F Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

14 September 1944

SUBJECT: Asa S. Bushnell

TO: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

1. With reference to the letter from Brig. Gen. Joseph N. Byron, Director, Special Services Division, Army Service Forces, dated 11 September 1944, in which he asks that Mr. Asa S. Bushnell, of our staff, be released for a special job with the U. S. Army athletic program, I have talked to Mr. Bushnell today and it is agreeable that we accede to General Byron's request.

2. I am enclosing herewith both the original letter from General Byron and also a reply for your signature if you care to use same.

H. L. ROBINSON
Colonel, F.A.
Chief, Schools & Training Branch

Incls. 2

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055 -[redacted]001a

Date 13 Sept. 44

To: Mr. Charles Cheston

A copy of the attached has been sent to the Schools and Training Branch which will prepare a reply for your signature.

J W Auchincloss
J. W. Auchincloss
1st Lt. JAGD

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES

~~WAR DEPARTMENT SERVICE~~
Washington 25, D.C.
Special Services Division

In reply refer to SPSPL 230. (11 Sept 44)

11 September 1944.

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
25th & E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

We understand that Mr. Asa S. Bushnell of Princeton, New Jersey, is at present a member of the staff of the Schools and Training Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.

In connection with the United States Army Athletic Program now being set up by the War Department as a feature of the demobilization process, there has been created in the New York office of the Special Services Division a new position, that of Special Advisor, Athletic Branch. We feel that Mr. Bushnell is particularly well qualified for this position because of his long and varied experience in athletic administration. Lt. Col. Henry W. Clark, Chief, Athletic Branch, may be required for immediate duty overseas and a nationally known sports personality is required in his absence. Accordingly, we are anxious immediately to assign Mr. Bushnell to the duties of this position for a period of three months or longer.

Would you be willing to grant Mr. Bushnell a leave of absence in order to permit him to accept this appointment and to render the important service in this capacity which is badly needed at this time?

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH W. BYRON,
Brigadier General,
Director, Special Services Division.

cc Robinson 9/13.

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DATE 7/12/49

FROM: Col. O

Publow discussed with Stacy. He agreed and seems fairly content tho he thoroughly would like the process himself!. It has been arranged with Stacy for limited information (sufficient for record-keeping) to be given to Stacy.

H.D.

Office of the General Counsel

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[redacted]

OSS Form 151

7 July

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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DATE 4 July 1944

TO: Col. Doering

I have discussed this memo with the Board of Review. They feel that Mr. Stacy's proposal has now become moot, in view of the functions which have been given to the Board since the writing of this memo, and that the Board's work will provide a record of funds obligated and will forestall any overobligation.

Col. Sears also asked me to point out to you that this memo was not sent to the Director via the Chief, Services.

John R. Schoemer, Jr.

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14,921

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan
Director

9 May 1944

FROM: John A. Stacy, Chief
Budget and Procedures Branch

The Office of Strategic Services' budget is consistently composed in the most general terms in order to provide the utmost flexibility in carrying out its wartime program. It, therefore, provides only a general control document and is not sufficiently specific to use as a hard and fast model in the agency's financial management.

In order to provide adequate budgetary control and financial programing it is essential that the Budget Office be specifically informed in advance of any single commitments involving in excess of $50,000 of OSS funds prior to the issuance of a formal commitment. Procurement officers as well as those individuals authorized to preliminarily negotiate OSS procurement should be required to discuss their programs in advance with the Budget Office and no commitment of agency funds, expressed or implied, should be made without the knowledge of both the Budget and Finance Offices. Adherence to the foregoing will forestall the eventuality of overobligation of available OSS funds.

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HEADQUARTERS
2677 HEADQUARTERS COMPANY EXPERIMENTAL
APO 512 U.S. ARMY

14 February 1944

SUBJECT: Lt. Cmdr. McBaine's letter to Lt. Col. Rodrigo - 7 February 1944.

TO : Brigadier General W. J. DONOVAN
Director, OSS

1. Attached is a letter of 7 February 1944 from Lt. Cmdr. Turner H. McBaine to Lt. Colonel Joseph Rodrigo mentioned in our cable #2167, with reference to Colonel Passy's request that we handle Greek-Cairo traffic for B.C.R.A.

WARWICK POTTER
Lt. Cmdr. USNR

Incl-1

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COPY

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
U. S. Army Forces in the
MIDDLE EAST

7 February 1944

Lt. Colonel Rodrigo,
Chief Intelligence Officer
OSS, Algiers

Dear Rodrigo:

Perhaps you may not remember me, but I have a very clear recollection of meeting you several times in Washington, even though I am a bit weak on your first initials.

I understand that you have taken over as Chief Intelligence Officer in Algiers, and welcome you as a neighbor and collaborator. Possibly future events will enable us to get together on a closer basis, since our Naples and Bari shows are not so very far apart.

Meanwhile, I have a matter which you or the Head of your French Section will be interested in.

A few days ago Rene Calvet, of the BCRA, called to see us. He began by stating that he had extremely close relationships with OSS Algiers and OSS Istanoul, namely Roseborough and Downes as his particular friends in the former place, and Macfarland in the latter. Partly because of the confused French situation and partly because we prefer to deal with a completely free hand in Syria, the only French territory in our Theater, we have never gone into the French picture at all, and consequently I was unable to assess his claims to close collaboration with our offices elsewhere.

M. Calvet then came quickly to the point by stating that there was a French diplomatic official, technically connected with Vichy, now living in Athens, on whom the Fighting French could count; that this man knew many contacts with whom the French had dealt for intelligence before the war, and who were still there; that there were quite a few Frenchmen now in Greece and in the TCCT, Labor battalions, etc.; and that he wanted to "collaborate" with us in tapping these sources of intelligence. Eliminating the hocus-pocus, he then suggested, in essence, that we (a) give him a radio set and take it and a French operator into Athens, and (b) bring written reports down out of Greece for them periodically on boats controlled by us.

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For security reasons I was completely non-committal at the first meeting. M. Calvet interpreted this as coolness to his proposition, and returned the next day with more hocus-pocus, but suggesting, in essence, that we postpone (a) above until successful collaboration had established mutual confidence and that meanwhile we carry cipher messages for them over our radio network, receiving copies of the messages after their decipherment by them.

I told M. Calvet that for us to (a) give him a radio set, or (b) carry messages in a chipher unknown to us, was contrary to our orders from Washington. I told him that the only possible basis on which we here could agree to collaboration, would be as follows: the French diplomat in Athens to send messages over our radio link to Cairo in a mutual cipher held both by the French and by us, with ourselves deciphering the messages here and at same time radioing them to Beirut for decipherment of the French share; and written material to be sent out in plain text, or in a mutual cipher known to both of us, with copies to each of us at a convenient point of arrival. M. Calvet did not like this proposition and said that he had no authority to disclose a French cipher; in response to the suggestion that the French diplomat use our cipher he stated that the former would work only for the Fighting French. He then suggested that we radio the messages from Athens to Istanbul rather than Cairo, and that their representative and Macfarlane would sit down and decipher messages in Istanbul. I told him that our radio links at Athens were in code, and that it would require a lot of trouble to change them into Istanbul. He stated that they did not want to send an officer into Cairo, thus clearly indicating that in any case he would try to avoid us handling the messages, in such a way that they could not be sure of hearing them come right in off the air - i. e. they would not trust us to handle the messages for them.

I advised M. Calvet that our proposition was all we could do without consultation elsewhere. As a matter of fact, we are not very keen about linking a Vichy diplomat into one of our systems. We have been at work in Greece for a considerable time, and have established a very satisfactory coverage there with great effort and trouble, and while we have several links in Athens itself, we definitely do not want to endanger any one of them, particularly to tap a source, the value and reliability of which seem at best dubious.

Accordingly M. Calvet, after consulting with his chief in Beirut, suddenly finds that he had more time than he at first thought, and is coming to Algiers. He will consult with his people and you there; and I am writing you this letter to advise you of our negotiations here, and to ask your advice as to whether we should take on this contact under any circumstances.

As I stated above, we know very little here of the French factions or personalities. In addition, we have done very little dealing with the Allied Intelligence Services other than the British, preferring to create our own systems accordingly, we would be greatly appreciative of any estimate you can give us as to the reliability and evaluation of M. Calvet and his organization.

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of the French diplomat at Athens, whose name Calvet will give you, head of the French circles in Greece.

As to the terms of the collaboration, if it is decided so, we shall insist on not carrying messages in a cipher unknown to us; we would prefer to be trusted by the French to deliver the messages to them, but we agree to any reasonable scheme for joint deciphering. We believe it would be best to try the latter for a while before giving them radio equipment and aiding them in establishing their own radio link.

Please let me know what happens with M. Calvet in Algiers, and I shall keep you advised on this end.

With best wishes,

Yours very truly,

[illegible] H. McBride,
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Chief Intelligence Officer
OSS

[illegible]

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OFFICE OF [illegible] SERVICES

SECRET

Washington, D.C.

3 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Gordon [illegible] Buxton

SUBJECT: Orders

1. You are authorized and directed to proceed to Cairo, Egypt, where you will report to the Strategic Services Officer for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Strategic Services Officer for the Mediterranean Theater.

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

Deputy Director, [illegible]

Deputy Chief SO

Theatre Officer-ME

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : General William Donovan

DATE [illegible]

FROM : [illegible] B. Fis[illegible]
Via : Dr. William L. Langer

SUBJECT: Mr. Dwight Litfield Bulkley 2055(M)

Privat. Bulkley was born in Margaret, Miss. on May [illegible] is an American citizen by birth. [illegible] was after wards attended the [illegible].

In addition to his [illegible] and Spanish, Mr. Bulkley has a [illegible] and [illegible] both written and spoken. The [illegible] understanding of the French [illegible] was to [illegible] in Haiti.

While there he [illegible] in Registration [illegible] visits to [illegible] Division, [illegible] pictures. In addition [illegible] he discovered [illegible] the [illegible] Division.

At the [illegible] Mr. Bulkley [illegible] and [illegible] Private Bulkley [illegible] other [illegible] ber.

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23 January 1944

Pfc. Dwight H. Bulkley
HQ and HQ Detachment
720 MP Battalion
Camp Beauregard, La.

Dear Private Bulkley:

We are returning to you herewith the documents containing miscellaneous information on Thailand which you sent to the Director of this Office with your letter of 10 January 1944. This material has been examined by the appropriate Branches of this Office and is returned to you in accordance with your request.

We understand that you have heard separately from our Personnel Procurement Branch concerning your expression of interest in being transferred to this Office.

Very truly yours,

Duncan C. Lee
Major, AUS
Chief, Secretariat

Bane:mlc

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January 10, 1944

Col. Donovan, Director,
Division of Foreign Propaganda,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir,

I recently heard of your department, and it was suggested to me that I might write, off the record, inquiring as to the possibility of my becoming affiliated in some manner with your organization.

Inclosed please find copy of a letter to the Adjutant General dated 28 July 1943, containing complete information on myself, and with indorsements which resulted in my being transferred to the Provost Marshal General's School of Military Government (Enlisted Course), Fort Custer, Michigan. Upon completion of the course December 10, 1943, it was determined that I was physically disqualified from overseas duty by reason of previous knee injury, which injury however does not impair normal activity or walking, and which condition I am willing to waive.

I sincerely feel that I could be of much more service where there is utilization of my background in Thailand, with knowledge of language, customs and people, as at the present time I am engaged in work of minor importance as a general clerk.

I have also inclosed a collection of miscellaneous information on Thailand which I have compiled in free time during the last year in the army, which material I am very anxious to have returned to me at your convenience.

I certainly would appreciate hearing from you as to where I might possibly fit in and whether there is an available opening in any capacity, with mention, if so, of what procedure I would have to take in making a formal request for transfer.

Very respectfully yours,

Dwight H. Bulkley

Dwight H. Bulkley, Pfc, ASN 39553789.
Hq. & Hq. Det., 726th MP Bn.
Camp Beauregard, Louisiana.

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[redacted]

Date 15 Jan. 1944.

To: Col. Connely.

We have received the attached letter from Congressman Pittenger in recommendation of Peter M. Purich, who, Mr. Pittenger understands, has made application for employment in O.S.S.

Would you advise us of the proper reply to be made to Mr. Pittenger by the Acting Director.

C. A. Bane.

To: Mr. Bane:

This candidate was submitted to ME-30, which is not presently interested but may be at some future date.

E.F.C.

E. F. C.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

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WILLIAM A. PITTENGER
EIGHTH DISTRICT
MINNESOTA

HOME ADDRESS:
DULUTH, MINN.

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:
HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
ROOM 448

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

January 12, 1944

Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan
Director
Office of Strategic Services
25th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gen. Donovan:

I am advised that Lt. Peter R. Burich, O-1544212, 1st Convalescent Hospital, A. P. O. 4[illegible], c/o Postmaster, Nashville, Tennessee, has made application for employment in the Office of Strategic Services and that a character reference letter is desired.

This young man comes well recommended and I shall appreciate greatly anything that can be done for him.

Very truly yours,

W A Pittenger

WAP:JC

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July 9, 1943

Honorable Howard Bucknell, Jr
The State Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Bucknell:

I deeply regret the fact that neither Dr. Rogers nor I had the pleasure of seeing you when you called on us earlier in the week at the Office of Strategic Services.

I know you will understand that if we had known that you were coming we would most certainly have arranged to welcome you.

Dr. Rogers has tried most earnestly to get in touch with you so we might persuade you to lunch with us. We understand today that a brief absence from the City has made that impossible.

We also hope that on your return, before final departure, we may still have a chance to see you since our London Office and the Embassy have so many mutual interests.

With fullest appreciation of your kindness in coming to see me, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

G. Edward Burton

GEB:WS

Acting Director

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SECRET

21 July 1945

SUBJECT: Recommendation for the Medal for Merit for Colonel O. Edward Buxton (inactive)

TO : The Medal for Merit Board
State Department
Washington, D. C.

1. It is recommended that the Medal for Merit be awarded to Colonel O. Edward Buxton (inactive) for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services in furtherance of the war efforts of the United States and the United Nations.

2. Colonel Buxton (who served with distinction as a Colonel in the 328th Infantry of the 82nd Division in the first World War) joined the Office of Coordinator of Information in September 1941. He immediately undertook to organize and direct the initial intelligence unit for the interview of refugees, seamen and other individuals who had left Europe and the Far East upon the outbreak of the war. Through his ingenuity and perseverance this unit obtained valuable political, economic and military intelligence of use to many agencies of the United States Government. Concurrently and in this connection Colonel Buxton developed contacts and relationships which proved to be an indispensable preliminary to the establishment of a secret intelligence organization.

3. Upon the establishment of the Office of Strategic Services (successor to COI) in June 1942 Colonel Buxton was appointed Assistant Director, a position which he occupied until 30 June 1945 when his resignation became effective. During the absence overseas of the Director (which occurred frequently and for extended periods) he assumed the duties of the Director.

4. As Assistant Director and second in command of OSS Colonel Buxton has worked to create on behalf of the United States Government an independent secret intelligence service and facilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups, sabotage and other special operations in enemy occupied territory. In this position he has been responsible for directing and supervising OSS activities not only in the Continental United States but also in the various theaters of operation.

5. In the summer of 1942 he traveled to the United Kingdom in order to carry out an assignment which was essential to the accomplishment

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of the objectives described in paragraph 4 above. First, he established in London a Headquarters from which, as the principal base of OSS operations in Western Europe, the training, briefing, dispatch and supply of agents on the continent were directed. Secondly, he established contact with the principal representatives of the other Allied clandestine services, laying the groundwork for a close working relationship which subsequently culminated in the establishment of a joint British-American Headquarters (SOE) under SHAEF for the support of resistance groups. In addition, through his exceptional ability, character and tact, he was able to draw upon the experience of the British in the clandestine field and to obtain information concerning operational procedures and techniques. Of outstanding value was the knowledge of British training methods which he acquired in the course of visits to British training schools. Without the benefit of this British experience which was made available as a result of contacts established and fostered through the resourcefulness and tact of Colonel Buxton, it would have been difficult for OSS to have recruited, trained and equipped agents in time to be of material assistance to American armies in the field.

6. During the period of service covered by this recommendation OSS grew to a strength of more than 12,000 officers, enlisted men and civilians who were stationed in the European, Mediterranean, India-Burma and China Theaters of Operation. In his capacity as Assistant Director, Colonel Buxton has labored tirelessly and effectively to perfect the organization and techniques required to carry out our basic directives. He personally planned and organized the dispatch of the first OSS field detachments to North Africa, the Middle East, the United Kingdom and the Far East. In the summer of 1944 he traveled to Italy and Southern France where his wise counsel and direction were of invaluable assistance to the work of the OSS detachments with the 5th and 7th American Armies.

7. The full extent of Colonel Buxton's contribution to the war effort of the United States and the United Nations can best be measured in terms of what OSS has been able to accomplish during the period covered by this recommendation. For this reason I am setting forth below a partial list of some of the more outstanding achievements of this Agency, to each of which Colonel Buxton as Acting Director and as Assistant Director has made a major contribution:

a. Intelligence and resistance activities in North Africa laying the ground work for the Torch Operation.

b. Organization, direction and supply of French Resistance in support of the Allied invasion of Western Europe and the battle of France.

c. Organization of intelligence networks in support of the 7th Army in Southern France.

d. Organization, supply and training of native Burmese resistance forces which conducted effective guerrilla operations against the Japanese and provided a major share of all intelligence available to Allied ground and air forces in Burma.

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e. Supply of and collaboration with the Italian Partisans movement, which constituted an effective fighting force in the rear of the enemy and provided a large volume of valuable tactical intelligence.

f. Anti-scorch campaign in North Italy carried out in conjunction with Italian Partisans thereby preventing destruction of strategic lines of communication including the Simplon Tunnel and of important utilities and industries in Venice, Genoa and Milan.

g. OSS air rescue activities which have resulted in saving the lives of hundreds of American airmen in Yugoslavia, Rumania, North Italy and Burma.

h. Capitulation of the German armies in North Italy as a result of negotiations initiated by and completed with the assistance of OSS representatives in both Switzerland and Italy.

Of those under my command, Colonel Buxton has been the single greatest contributor to the success of the United States Government in establishing its own independent facilities for world-wide secret intelligence and operations. His services have been so exceptionally meritorious as to warrant the highest recognition from his Government.

8. This recommendation is based on my personal observation since 1941 and on the record of this office.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
(ETO)

6 June 1945

Dear Ned:

I am going to carry this letter back with me because I want to be sure that it gets to you. Today you are leaving the organization. It is a serious moment both for me and for the organization. For me because, as I always told you, you tempered my sometime harshness with good sense and consideration. For the organization, because your wisdom and farsightedness will be lost to it.

The years that we have now been together in this organization seem to have telescoped into just a few months. But many things have happened, and together we have faced a lot of problems and a great many difficulties. But they were rather fun to meet so long as such a superb soldier as you was at one's side.

I hope this war hasn't taken too much out of you.

You've done a real job for your country, Ned, and while I am sorry we are not going to be as closely together to the end, you can bet your life that I am going to cling to you and have you do as much as you feel able to take on.

Best of luck to you, and when I get home, I want to see you.

Sincerely,

Col. C. Edward Buxton
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

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PLEASE DELIVER TO SECRETARY OF STATE BYRNES AT HIS PLACE THE FOLLOWING: "TOGETHER WITH YOUR FRIENDS AM MOST PLEASED TO SEE FINALLY HAPPEN THAT WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE LONG BEFORE THIS. YOUR APPOINTMENT GIVES NEW CONFIDENCE TO AMERICANS AND NEW RESPECT FOR US IN OTHER COUNTRIES. HOPE YOU WILL PERMIT US TO BE OF HELP TO YOU."

TOR: 1100 1 JULY 1945

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SECRET

8 April 1944

From: The Director, Office of Strategic Services
To : The Secretary of the Navy.

Via : Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Lieutenant (j.g.) R. J. BURKE, U.S.N.R., Commendation of

Reference: (a) Secret Report McGregor Project (attached).
(b) Secret Letter from Director, OSS to The Secretary of the Navy, Subject: Lt. Comdr. John L. SHAHEEN, USNR, Commendation of.
(c) Secret Letter from Director, OSS to The Secretary of the Navy, Subject: Lt. (j.g.) Henry Ringling NORTH, USNR, Commendation of.

1. The undersigned has the privilege and honor of reporting several acts of heroism on the part of the Subject Officer and recommends that the Order of the Silver Star be awarded therefor.

2. The Subject Officer acted as executive officer of the McGregor Project (code name) team, together with officers mentioned in References (b) and (c), which carried on subversive war among Flag Officers of the Royal Italian Navy during the months of July, August and September 1943. He handled matters of great import in a manner which showed courage, competence, and complete devotion to duty.

3. The Subject Officer showed a remarkable combination of courage and ingenuity in the planning and execution of this task, displaying sagacity beyond his years in developing strategy and participating in all phases of its execution.

4. In the execution of this hazardous assignment the Subject Officer on three different nights prior to D-Day, during the month of August, 1943, assisted in the planning and participated in the landing of agents several hundred miles deep into enemy waters along the west coast of Italy from Terracina, south to Calabria. The parties were transported by PT boat from Palerro to prearranged pin points. In these operations, on moonless nights, the PT boats approached to within 200 or 300 yards of the enemy's shore and agents were landed by rubber boat. German and Italian coast defenses sweep every foot of this coastline which was under a twenty-four hour alert as the enemy was readying for our invasion. The landings were carried out, successfully and undetected, although machine gun nests and pill boxes covered the first two pin points and the third was under beach patrol.

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5. During the months of July, August and September 1943, the Subject Officer nine different times was under severe bombing and shell and mortar fire in Palermo and Salerno and with the Allied Invasion Fleet off the beaches, south of Salerno, as is recounted in the attached report under Part B of section 5, entitled "CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY". The Subject Officer was a member of this party in Salerno whose objective was to contact the Italian Naval Headquarters in Salerno and Naples and through them to reach various Italian Flag Officers mentioned in the attached report under the heading "RESULTS". During this period the Subject Officer, working against time, against odds, and against handicaps, almost insuperable in nature, carried out the details of his duty in a most effective manner. At one point when given the opportunity to leave Salerno which through enemy shelling and mortar fire was becoming a virtual death trap, the Subject Officer decided to stay on, stating the simple fact that he was needed to complete the job.

6. When it was necessary to leave Salerno to rejoin the Invasion Fleet, although the sea approaches to Salerno harbor were under the direct fire of enemy guns in the hills overlooking Salerno bay, the Subject Officer assisted in evacuating the party. In the evacuation from Salerno under emergency circumstances a first attempt was made to leave the city by means of a small British Landing Craft (LCA). As the LCA attempted to leave the harbor several salvos from the enemy artillery in the hills were laid down before the craft and she was forced to return to the comparative safety of anchorage in the inner-harbor. The city of Salerno and the harbor area were under steady artillery and mortar fire all during this time. The party then proceeded to the end of the outer mole which extended three-quarters of a mile into the harbor. The enemy in the hills spotted the group and laid down several salvos of artillery fire.

7. The Subject Officer displayed extraordinary heroism and a conspicuous devotion to duty in the fulfillment of subject mission. His efficient and utter disregard for his own personal safety exhibited a courage and devotion to duty in keeping with the tradition of the United States Naval Service.

William J. Donovan

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November 8, 1943

The Honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that several days ago we discussed the promotion of Ensign D. H. Burke, USNR, file No. 27-981, to the temporary rank of Lieutenant (jg). I am now formally recommending this temporary promotion because he needs the additional rank to carry out effectively his new duties as Executive Officer of the Special Projects Section of the Operations Branch of OSS. He has been given this new duty because of his courageous and outstanding service as Executive Officer of the subversion project among flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy.

Burke was originally commissioned an Ensign D-V(S) on April 15, 1943, and served as First Assistant Area Operations Officer for the North African Theater until ordered overseas on the above mentioned secret mission. Prior to that, however, while still a civilian, because of his qualifications for war work, he had served in OSS as Assistant Area Operations Officer for the North African Theater where his work was most commendable. He has completed the course of training at two of our special operations secret military schools.

His present duties in this country as well as his future duties on returning to foreign service involve working with U.S. Army and United Nations officers who are from one to several grades higher than his present one.

Both the Navy and the OSS will be benefited by this promotion and I request that it be granted as expeditiously as possible.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

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Burke, Edmund M.

In reply address not the signer of this letter, but Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Refer to No. Pers-362-bcl

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 17, 1943.

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Director of Strategic Services.

Subject: Edmund Michael Burke.

1. You are hereby informed that Edmund Michael Burke has been commissioned an Ensign, D-V(S), U. S. Naval Reserve. He was ordered on April 16 to procede and report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Strategic Services. These orders were sent via the Director of Naval Officer Procurement, Washington, D. C.

Randall Jacobs,
The Chief of Naval Personnel.

By direction.
B. S. Mansfield,

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[illegible], 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Lt. Commander [illegible] with
Naval Liaison Officer

FROM: R. Davis Halliwell
Deputy Chief, SO

SUBJECT: Commissioning of Edward [illegible]

1. Subject has been named the Mediterranean Supply Officer for our North African Invasion which was approved by General Eisenhower yesterday. Cable received from Lt. Colonel Huntington, Chief of SO, now in Algiers, stated that the North African Supply Officer is "urgently needed to meet [illegible] arrive with troops". The [illegible] being [illegible] immediately dispatched to North Africa [illegible] not yet [illegible] officer.

2. [illegible] has had [illegible] and his [illegible] in addition to the [illegible] particularly qualify him [illegible] prior. This work [illegible] and it cannot be [illegible].

3. Subject has [illegible] application to [illegible] Procurement, Treasury Department, Washington, D.C. I understand that [illegible] all requisite for the requirements for a commission except [illegible] which will in no way affect his work. It is requested that this application be [illegible] and this officer be waived so that he can be commissioned as soon as possible. We would like to have him commissioned as a S-(S) officer.

4. This was discussed with Mr. Murphy, and he is in full accord with this action.

R. Davis Halliwell
Deputy Chief, SO

cc: Mr. James Murphy

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XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 29, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I understand that an application has been filed by Edmund Michael Burke, who is now in the employ of this office.

In view of the fact that Mr. Burke from his civilian status of employment point, it is desired to use him in connection with special and confidential work, in a commissioned status.

Therefore, if and when Mr. Burke is commissioned, it is respectfully requested that he be assigned to this office for duty.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

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1 April 1954

Colonel [illegible] Luttler
Combined [illegible]
[illegible]ington, [illegible]

Dear Colonel:

I was very pleased to [illegible] the contents of the correspondence between [illegible] and Mr. Butt. May I congratulate you on the high praise attained in Mr. Butt's communication.

I know Colonel Bruce will be glad to [illegible] of this letter.

Sincerely,

[illegible]ard Lunton
Acting Director

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COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 5, 1944

Col. G. E. Buxton
Assistant Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel:

As you were kind enough to take an interest in my fortunes last year, I should like to have you see the enclosed exchange of letters between General Marshall and Mr. Batt. Perhaps you would be kind enough also to forward it to Col. Bruce in London, to whom I also feel indebted for his kind interest.

Cordially yours,

Hugh D. Butler, Col., AUS

Enclosures

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because of the close level of [illegible] and Orient, the work of the [illegible] ted by an increased in the [illegible].

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It is our understanding that Col. [illegible] was not the usual minimum requirements of nine months service in his present rank and is therefore eligible for promotion.

Being fully cognizant of the [illegible] in the solution of [illegible] planning, we have overcome our [illegible] connections with Yugoslavia. We feel that the work performed by Colonel Butler during his stay [illegible] been most worthy, and concurrently [illegible] his record before you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ [illegible]

[illegible] Pitt
U. S. [illegible]

- - - - - -

[illegible], 1945

Mr. [illegible] Pitt
United States Senate, Office
Committee on Military Affairs
Washington, D. C.

Dear [illegible] Pitt:

I am in receipt of your letter of March 7th concerning Colonel [illegible] Butler. It is reassuring to know that his assistance is so highly valued by your organization. As you know, Butler was promoted to Colonel on March 13th.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ [illegible]

Chief of Staff

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[redacted]

Date: _____

Foreign Policy
Papers Compiled
[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Copy of file sent to
[illegible]
[illegible] Dulles
[illegible]

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Date: 10/21/43

To: Ensign Putzell

Re: attached correspondence in connection with transfer of Lt.Col.Hugh Butler

memo from Howard Bruce 10/9/43
letter to Secy.of War from C.E.Wilson 9/30/43
letter from Col.Butler to Col.Buxton 10/11/43
Col.Buxton's reply

Please see that Mr.Shepardson has a complete record of this correspondence for his files, also the same to be made a part of Col.Butler's record with OSS.

Both Col.Bigelow and Gen.Donovan have seen and approved the outgoing letter.

G.E.B.

G. Edward Buxton
Assistant Director

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October 19, 19[illegible]3

Lt.Colonel Hugh B. Cutler
Combined Production and Resources Board
Washington, D.C.

Dear Colonel Cutler:

Replying to your recent letter let me state that I am glad to furnish our Military Headquarters with a copy of the letter sent by W.P.B. Chairman to the Secretary of War containing the very complimentary request for your transfer.

I am sure it will be made a part of your record in the Office of Production Services. I am also sending a copy to Mr. Harrison.

I am afraid you misunderstood, in part, the discussion in this office arising from your suggestion that you be considered for promotion before transfer.

Your letter refers to my [illegible] statement that the Office of Production Services had no vacancy for a full Colonelcy in Continental United States. I was not, of course, in a position to say that General Donovan and our Military Board would have recommended such promotion because the matter has never come before either the General or the Board. I was, however, pointing out that for the practical reason above stated it would not be possible for you to have the matter presented. This is not an important point and I know you will understand it is made only in the interest of accuracy.

I am sure that you will have a most useful and interesting opportunity awaiting

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you in your present work.

Very sincerely yours,

[redacted]

[redacted]

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COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 11, 1943

Colonel G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director of the Office of
Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Buxton:

A letter from Mr. C. E. Wilson, United States Deputy Member, Combined Production and Resources Board, relative to my transfer from O.S.S. to the Board has gone to the Secretary of War as per enclosed copy.

I should like very much to get a note from you covering the point you made verbally to me in your office; namely, that the reason why O.S.S. was not in a position to recommend my promotion from Lt. Col. to Col. was the lack of a vacancy in your tables of organization for Colonelcies.

I hesitate to bother you on this point - considering that General Donovan very kindly recommended my promotion to the War Department on two previous occasions, but it would complete my records in satisfactory fashion to have such a note from you; I am sure you will agree.

As mentioned to you, I should like to have the Combined Production and Resources Board letter (copy enclosed) to go into my personal record in O.S.S. As this I believe is a centralized file in the Administration Building, I thought perhaps Mr. Shepardson would also like to have a copy of this for any files maintained in S.I. At any rate, I should like to have him informed about this position as I have not had an opportunity to see him personally since these developments took place.

I certainly have enjoyed the privilege of working under the General's and your direction, and regret that circumstances have made it seem desirable for me to leave O.S.S., - going back as I am into the field of International Trade, which is the one for which my experience best fits me.

Cordially yours,

Hugh D. Butler, Lt. Col., AUS

Attachments Also, please see supporting letter from the Quartermaster General attached.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
Headquarters Army Service Forces
Washington

SPQKF 201 (Butler, Hugh D.) Lt. Col. 9 October 1943.

SUBJECT: Request for Assignment Lt. Colonel Hugh D. Butler to Combined Production and Resources Board

TO: Assistant Chief of [illegible], [illegible] Operations [illegible], Room [illegible] [illegible], Washington, D. C.

1. This office is advised that Mr. C. [illegible] Wilson, U. S. Deputy Member of the Combined Production and Resources Board, is desirous to have Secretary of War, dated 30 September 1943, requesting that Lt. Colonel Hugh D. Butler, currently serving as Secretary of the Combined Coal Committee and of its various sub-committees of three months and the Combined Production Board, [illegible] be [illegible].

2. This office has further been informed by Mr. Harold Smith, acting Director of the Office of Strategic Services, [illegible] Lt. Colonel Butler [illegible] to the projected assignment.

3. The work of the Combined Coal Committee [illegible] international coal situation and in preparing [illegible] with its sub-committee in London and authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom, in arriving [illegible] requirements for overseas operational purposes [illegible] liberated territories, is highly important to the [illegible].

4. The fact that Lt. Colonel Butler [illegible] experience in military and commercial affairs [illegible] in London enables him to render a valuable service to the War Department, as well as to the Combined Boards, in his present capacity. It is of further value to the War Department to have an officer continually [illegible] Combined Coal Committee to [illegible] and keep him advised of day to day [illegible] War Department interests.

5. In the light of the [illegible] in Paragraph 4 above, this office indorses the request that Lt. Colonel Butler be [illegible] assigned to the Combined Production and Resources Board [illegible] Combined Shipping Board, as outlined in Paragraph 2 above.

HOWARD BRUCE,
Acting Director of Material.

maj

(7983)

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COPY

COMBINED PRODUCTION AND RESOURCES BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 30, 1943

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Combined Production and Resources Board and Combined Raw Materials Board have established a Combined Coal Committee to study the international coal situation and to recommend in collaboration with its sub-committee in London and authorities in the United States and the United Kingdom, action on problems of supply and requirements for overseas operational purposes and for conquered and liberated territories. When this Committee was formed during the latter part of August, we were fortunate to secure from the Office of Strategic Services the loan of the services of Lt. Col. Hugh D. Butler, for one month. During the term of this detail, which has now expired, Colonel Butler has been serving as Secretary of the Coal Committee, and of its sub-committees on Mining Machinery, South Africa and the Mediterranean area. He has performed the services of his duties in such a manner that we feel he would be a valuable permanent addition to the Combined Staff of the Combined Production and Resources Board. Additionally, his wide background of experience in military and commercial affairs both here and in London will enable him to render valuable service on other problems with which the Board has to deal.

As one of the most important phases of the Coal Committee's work is the problem of meeting the expanding coal requirements of the Army and Navy, we feel that it is particularly desirable, necessary even, to have an Army officer on this assignment. This would facilitate the negotiations among the members who represent the service agencies of the three countries. For these reasons I should like to request you to designate Colonel Butler to serve with us and under our direction. Colonel G. Edward Buxton, Acting Director of the Office of Strategic Services, has informed us orally that they are agreeable to the release of Colonel Butler for this assignment and therefore will interpose no objection to our request. In this connection attached is a copy of a letter of September 24, from the Office of Strategic Services signed by Charles S. Cheston for the Director.

We are cognizant of the importance to the War Department of commissioned personnel of the caliber and experience of Colonel Butler, but we feel that the task before the Combined Production and Resources Board and the importance of its work to the Army justify this request. We should appreciate it very much indeed if you would make this designation.

Sincerely yours,

/s/
C. F. Wilson
U. S. Deputy Member

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.

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January 26, 194[illegible]

MEMORANDUM

For: Colonel Ware

From: Mr. Murphy

I [illegible] attention [illegible] letter. You will note [illegible] requirements of War Department Circular No. 290, [illegible] I am wondering whether [illegible] your word.

8

Background.

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OSTAL TELEGRAPH POSTAL TELEGRAP

W4 26 CABLE VIA CCC

SANSORIGINE DATED 22 NFT

NLT JAMES MURPHY OF STRATEGIC SERVICE

WASHN DC

CAN YOU GIVE INFORMATION REGARDING MY PROMOTION LEFT WITH MAJOR

HURLEY OFFICE CHIEF STAFF BEST REGARDS

HUGH BUTLER

145P

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CONFIDENTIAL

AG 201-Butler, Hugh D.
(10-30-42)PO-P

JAS/mcd/1660

November 24, 1942

Director of Strategic Services,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Reference is made to your letter of October 30, 1942, addressed to General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, requesting that Lieutenant Colonel Hugh D. Butler, O-402009, Air Corps, be detailed in the General Staff Corps.

A number of similar requests have already been denied you for the reason that duties assigned to officers of your organization are not of a General Staff nature, and thus, as a matter of policy, I am sorry to advise that officers of this activity cannot be accorded General Staff status.

The War Department does not concur in the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Butler to the grade of Colonel on the basis of the recommendation contained in your letter. Recommendations for promotion forwarded to The Adjutant General must conform to the requirements of War Department Circulars No. 161 and No. 290, 1942, as is required of other commands and activities. Recommendations which fail to meet fully the requirements and intent of these instructions will not receive favorable consideration by the War Department.

Very truly yours,

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE

WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO

AG 201-Butler, Hugh D.
(10-30-42)PO-P

JAG/mcl/1660

November 24, 1942

Director of Strategic Services,

Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

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Very truly yours,

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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Note -- Lieut. Colonel Butler's British Experience.

In addition to his past two years of active duty, Lieut. Colonel Butler's record includes:

Nine years of foreign service as Assistant Commercial Attache, American Embassy, London;
Navy War College -- Lecturer on British (Economic) Capabilities and Situation;
Army Industrial College -- Lecturer on British (Economic) Capabilities and Situation;
Author of THE UNITED KINGDOM, a financial, industrial, and commercial handbook (1,000 pages), published by the U. S. Department of Commerce, and THE IRISH FREE STATE, a book of a similar nature, concerning Eire.
Regular contributor to The Economist (London), The Christian Science Monitor, The Harvard Business Review, etc., etc.

W.J.D.

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October 31, 1942

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Marshall:

It is recommended that Lt. Colonel Hugh B. Butler, [illegible] 0-402009, at present assigned to the Office [illegible] as advisor on Military Intelligence Service affairs, [illegible] acts as confidential liaison officer between the Office of Strategic Services and G2, be promoted to the rank of Colonel, and assigned to the General Staff Corps, for [illegible] this office.

Lt. Colonel Butler was promoted to his present rank on February 1, 1942.

His work with the Office of Strategic Services has been outstanding. He has demonstrated his ability to cope with the many complex and unusual problems of this office in a superior manner.

I am requesting the issuance of orders detailing Lt. Colonel Butler to do similar duties between my office in London and the

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General Marshall: October 31, 1942

office of the Military Attache, and the increased [illegible] would enhance his effectiveness in carrying out [illegible].

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan
Director

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October 3[illegible], 1 [illegible]2

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Marshall:

It is recommended that Lt. Colonel [illegible] O-402009, at present assigned to the Office of Strategic Services as advisor on military intelligence service [illegible], [illegible] acts as confidential liaison officer between the Office of Strategic Services and G2, be promoted to the rank of Colonel, and assigned to the General Staff Corps, for duties [illegible] this office.

Lt. Colonel Butler was promoted to his present rank on February [illegible], 1942.

His work with the Office of Strategic Services has been outstanding. He has demonstrated his ability to cope with many complex and unusual problems of this office in a capable manner.

I am requesting the issuance of orders detailing Lt. Colonel Butler to do similar duties between my office in London and the

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General Marshall:

October 31, 1942

office of the Military Attache, and [illegible] would enhance his effectiveness in carrying out that assignment.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan
Director

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COPY

August 8, 1942

Honorable William J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Donovan:

This is in reply to your letters of July 9 and July 13, relating to Army officers for duty in your office.

All interested agencies have been informed that officers will not be relieved from the Office of Strategic Services under the recently announced policy governing relief of officers from civilian agencies.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War

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July [illegible], 1941

My dear Mr. [illegible]:

[illegible] letters of [illegible]

[illegible] personnel [illegible] the duties [illegible] Services. [illegible] Special [illegible] order and was [illegible] President as Commander-in-Chief. I am sure [illegible] you know that we are included in the list [illegible] Special Agencies.

I will appreciate it if you will [illegible] the Assistant General to [illegible] your order of July 8 does not apply to the Office of Strategic Services.

Respectfully,

William J. Donovan

The Honorable

[illegible] Secretary of War,

[illegible]ington, D. C.

MPG/D

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 8 concerning the transfer of Lieut. Colonel Hugh D. Butler from the Military Intelligence Service, War Department, to your organization.

I would be glad to approve this transfer except for the fact that the Secretary of War has issued instructions as of July 8 that there shall be no further transfer of officers from War Department organizations to non-military organizations. I am therefore unable to comply with your request.

I am informed that Lieut. Col. Hugh D. Butler is assigned to the Intelligence Group, M.I.S., and to the Contact Section thereof, and his principal duties are to maintain liaison with your organization. I have given instructions that Lieut. Col. Butler will for the time being remain on that duty and provide the liaison required by the chief of the Intelligence Group from his office to yours.

Yours sincerely,

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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

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RESTRICTED

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel J. Edward Buxton

DATE: 18 January 1944

FROM: Robert Thrun

SUBJECT:

The attached memorandum is to be held for General Donovan after you have seen it.

It has also been suggested that the reasons set forth in Mr. Krider's memorandum should be brought to the attention of Senator Byrd whose report raised the question concerning the liberality of Civil Service promotions in OSS. I feel, however, that the report sounds rationalized. One reason which has been omitted but which may have considerable validity is that the rapid expansion in size of the agency has made it necessary to promote personnel to responsible positions more rapidly than would otherwise have been true.

RT

Robert Thrun

Colonel Buxton saw the above note and agreed with it. He suggested that the matter be placed in the file for General Donovan's attention upon his return.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO. Major C. M. Sears

DATE Dec. 2, 1944

FROM. M. S. Krider

SUBJECT Senator Byrd's Report Regarding the Liberality of Promotions

Senator Byrd's report regarding the liberality of promotions of Civil Service personnel within the Office of Strategic Services indicates basically a sound personnel policy as the following items:

1. Generally, the Office of Strategic Services' [redacted] employs personnel at the base grade and salary rate that they were receiving in their previous employment, either Federal Government or private industry. The reason for this being that in order to obtain the quality and efficiency of the work, the Personnel Branch does not feel that it is wise in every case to transfer or hire personnel at a promotion rate. This policy in many cases eliminates those individuals who are seeking change of employment only for promotion purposes. The staff of the Personnel Office are well trained in handling this type of individual.

2. Senator Byrd's report indicated that 45% of the employees of the Office of Strategic Services had been promoted within any one year. This is a direct result of the policy mentioned in Item No. 1, basically, that after an employee has been appointed at no increase in salary and has proven his efficiency he has then proven that the position which he was employed for has increased in responsibility, therefore warranting promotion. In this manner, fewer mistakes are made in the original hiring of individuals.

3. The figure of 45% indicated in the Byrd report shows that this agency is generally not hiring people from the outside for those positions which employees within OSS could be promoted to. In other words, it shows a very well established promotion-from-within policy throughout all of OSS.

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

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[illegible]

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[illegible]